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Abstract
This article formally analyzes the causes of underinvestment in electric power generation, and
the various corrective market designs that have been proposed and implemented. It yields four
main analytical ndings. First, using a simple numerical example, (a linear demand function,
calibrated on the French power load duration curve), strategic supply reduction is shown to be
a more important cause of underinvestment than the imposition of a price cap. Second, physical
capacity certicates markets implemented in the United States restore optimal investment, but
increase producers prots beyond the imperfect competition level. Third, nancial reliability
options, proposed in many markets, fail to restore investment incentives. If a "no short sale"
condition is added, they are equivalent to physical capacity certicates. Finally, if competition is
perfect, energy only markets yield a negligible underinvestment compared to the optimum. Taken
together, these ndings suggest that, to ensure generation adequacy, policy makers should put more
e¤ort on enforcing competitive behavior in the energy markets, and less on designing additional
markets.
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JEL Classication: L13, L94
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1 Introduction
An essential objective of the restructuring of the electric power industry in the 1990s was to "push to
the market" decisions and risks associated with investment in power generation, i.e., to have market
forces, not bureaucrats, determine how much investment is required, and to have investors, not rate-
payers, bear the risk of excess capacity, construction cost overruns and delays.
However, since the early 2000s, generation adequacy has become an issue of concern for policy
makers, power System Operators (SOs), and economists. It would appear that, contrary to the initial
belief, the "market" does not necessarily provide for the adequate level of generation capacity. Britain,
that pioneered the restructuring of the electricity industry in 1990, constitutes the most recent and
striking example: Ofgem, the energy regulator warns of possible power shortages around 2015 (Ofgem
(2010)).
Operating and regulatory practices aimed at preventing the exercise of market power are often
considered to be the primary cause of this "market failure". As shown in Marcel Boiteux (1949)s
seminal analysis, high prices in some states of the world are required to nance the optimal capacity.
However, in most jurisdictions SOs impose de jure or de facto price caps, that deprive producers of
these high prices. This revenue loss, called "missing money", is considered an important driver of
underinvestment in generation (Joskow (2007)).
Therefore, SOs and policy makers worldwide have designed and implemented a variety of market
designs to correct this apparent "market failure" (Finon and Pignon (2008)). For example, most
US power markets have adopted highly structured and prescriptive physical certicates markets, and
many European countries are considering, designing or implementing capacity mechanisms1.
These mechanisms are extremely complex, hence expensive to set up and run. Furthermore, they
constitute a partial reversion towards central planning, which restructuring precisely attempted to
eliminate: using a centralized system reliability model, the SO sets a generation capacity target, and
organizes its procurement. Risk of overcapacity is borne by consumers, while risk of cost overrun is
borne by investors. A rigorous economic analysis of the causes of underinvestment in generation and
the various market designs implemented by SOs to restore investment incentives is therefore required.
1France formally instituted a capacity obligation mechanism in March 2012, to be e¤ective in 2015. Britain, Germany,
and Belgium are designing mechanisms to ensure adequate capacity.
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This is the objective of this article. I am not aware of any previous systematic analytical comparison
of these designs.
This work draws on a rich literature, that can be structured along two themes. A rst group of
articles examines generation investment in restructured power markets. While these works di¤er in
important aspects, most model two stage games: in stage 1, producers decide on installed capacity;
in stage 2 they produce and sell in the spot markets, subject to the installed capacity constraint. For
example, Borenstein and Holland (2005) and Joskow and Tirole (2007), building on Boiteux (1949),
have developed the "benchmark" model of optimal investment and production when (i) demand is
uncertain at the time the investment decision is made, and (ii) a fraction of the demand does not
react to price. The former article considers the perfect competition case, while the latter introduces
some elements of imperfect competition. Murphy and Smeers (2005) have developed models of closed-
and open-loop Cournot competition at the investment and spot market stages, and characterized the
equilibria of these games. Boom (2009) has examined the impact of vertical integration on equilibrium
investment, while Fabra et al. (2011) have examined the impact of the structure of the auction in
the spot market on the equilibrium investment. This article builds on the two-stage Cournot game
formalized in Zöttl (2011). A more recent literature (e.g., Garcia and Shen (2010)) examine multiperiod
investment decisions.
A second group of works describes and analyzes the possible "corrective" market designs. Stoft
(2002) discusses average Value of Lost Load pricing, Hogan (2005) proposes an energy cum operating
reserves markets, and Cramton and Stoft (2006 and 2008) and Cramton and Ockenfels (2011) propose
a nancial reliability options mechanism2. Joskow and Tirole (2007) show that a capacity market and
a price cap do not restore the rst best with more than two states of the world. Chao and Wilson
(2005) examine the impact of options on spot market equilibrium, investment, and welfare. Zöttl
(2011) determines the welfare maximizing price cap in the spot market. However, none of these works
presents a rigorous comparison of these mechanisms in a general and common setting.
This article bridges these two strands of literature, that analyzes the proposals described in the
second group of articles using a rigorous economic model developed in the rst group: an extension of
the two-stage Cournot model developed by Zöttl (2011) to include both "price reactive" customers and
2Since these mechanisms are described extensively in the article, they are not developped further here.
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"constant price customers", the latter being unable to react to spot energy prices and being rationed
in some instances (Borenstein and Holland (2005), Joskow and Tirole (2007), Stoft (2002), and Hogan
(2005)). Its contribution is to propose clear policy recommendations, building on the economic analysis
of underinvestment and corrective market designs. While this works primary focus is the electric power
industry, the analysis presented here can serve as a basis to examine (under)investment issues in other
industries where participants must select capacity in the presence of signicant demand variability and
uncertainty and limited storage possibilities, for example telecommunications and transport networks.
The analysis yields four main analytical ndings, that can inform policy makers.
First, Proposition 1 characterizes two su¢ cient conditions for underinvestment: (i) strategic supply
reduction from imperfectly competitive producers, or (ii) a binding price cap, the missing money
problem identied earlier. This works contribution is not the result per se, but the analysis of the
relative impact of the two causes of underinvestment. If competition is perfect, using an illustrative
numerical example (a linear demand function, calibrated on the French power load duration curve),
a 3 000 e=MWh price cap, which is the current level in European markets, is never binding. Any
underinvestment would thus be entirely caused strategic supply reduction. A much lower price cap at
1 000 e=MWh yields installed capacity 0:9% lower than optimal if 5% of the load is price responsive.
If rationing is anticipated and proportional, strategic supply reduction is more important than a
1 000 e=MWh price cap in reducing capacity as soon as more than 3:9% of the load is price responsive.
For example, strategic supply reduction is 1:5 times more important than a 1 000 e=MWh price cap
in reducing capacity if 5% of the load is price responsive. These results are robust to using a much
lower price elasticity.
This observation is original to this work, that casts a new light on the cause of underinvestment,
emphasizing strategic supply reduction as opposed to the specicities of the power industry.
Second, Proposition 2 examines the equilibrium of markets where energy and forward physical
installed capacity certicates are separately exchanged. This is the case for example in the Northeast
of the United States: 3 to 5 years ahead, the SO procures from producers physical capacity certi-
cates (usually 15 to 20% higher than anticipated peak load to protect against supply and demand
uctuations). The cost of these purchases is then passed on to customers. Proposition 2 shows that
the SO must impose a "no short sale" requirement, i.e., require producers to sell less certicates than
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have installed capacity (or to build as much capacity as they have sold certicates). If she does, a
physical capacity certicates market restores investment incentives: the resulting capacity installed is
optimal. Social welfare is thus maximized. However, producers prots are higher than the imperfect
competition outcome without the capacity market.
The last result is original to this work. Coupled with the previous analysis of the causes of
underinvestment, it casts a new light on physical certicates markets: the common wisdom is that
these markets are required to compensate the missing money. If, as suggested by the illustrative
numerical example, strategic supply reduction is indeed the main driver of underinvestment, physical
certicates markets then sur-remunerate this strategic behavior, hence should not be implemented.
As in most industries, increasing e¤ective competition is the main policy tool to achieve generation
adequacy.
Third, Proposition 3 analyzes the equilibrium of another form of forward markets, where producers
are required to sell nancial call options to customers, covering all the demand up to a certain level at
a given strike price. Option sellers pay customers the di¤erence between the actual spot energy price
and the strike price (Cramton and Stoft (2006 and 2008), Cramton and Ockenfels (2011)). The sale
of options is expected to solve the underinvestment problem, as producers are nancially exposed to
high power prices.
However, Proposition 3 proves this intuition holds only partially: options sale reduces but does
not eliminate underinvestment. Installed capacity is higher with options sale than without, but still
lower than socially optimal. To ensure optimal investment, the SO must again impose a "no short
sale" requirement. If she does, Proposition 4 shows that "dual markets" relying on nancial reliability
options or on physical capacity certicates are equivalent if the "technical" parameters are identical
(e.g., if the option strike price equals the wholesale price cap). Reliability options thus also sur-
remunerate strategic underinvestment. While Propositions 3 and 4 are consistent with Chao and
Wilson (2005) and Allaz and Villa (1993)s theoretical analysis of the interaction between forward and
spot markets, they are new to the literature.
The last analytical nding is a clarication of the economics of two "energy only" market designs,
where prices in the energy market are expected to be high enough to restore investment incentives.
These market designs have limited impact on strategic supply reduction: if generation is imperfectly
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competitive, underinvestment will remain. Hence, the research question is whether they restore the
missing money under perfect competition.
Consider rst average Value of Lost Load (V oLL) pricing, presented for example by Steven Stoft
(2002) and implemented in Texas: the SO sets a price cap at the average V oLL, an estimate of the
average value for users of not being curtailed, typically around 10 000 to 20 000 $=MWh. Proposition
1 applies: a price cap, even very high, reduces investment incentives. However, if generation is
competitive and the cap high enough, the numerical illustration suggests the distortion is negligible.
Finally, consider the "energy cum operating reserves market" proposed by Hogan (2005). SOs pro-
cure operating reserves to protect against an unplanned generation outage. Hogan (2005) proposes the
SO balances supply against demand for energy and operating reserves, subject to the average V oLL
being used as a price cap. Producers receive additional revenues since: (i) the resulting power price is
higher than when the SO balances supply against demand for energy alone, and (ii) capacity providing
operating reserves but no energy is remunerated. This additional revenue is expected to resolve
the missing money problem, hence restores investment incentives. However, Proposition 5 shows this
intuition is invalid: since these additional revenues are already accounted for in the determination
of the installed capacity, the situation is isomorphic to average V oLL pricing, hence Proposition 1
applies. If generation is competitive, a high price cap induces a negligible underinvestment.
The analysis summarized above suggests that, despite its specic physical features, the power
industry is not that di¤erent from other industries: strategic supply reduction is the main cause of
underinvestment. Assuming this observation is conrmed using other specications of power demand,
the analysis yields clear policy recommendations.
If policy makers and the SO are condent a market is su¢ ciently competitive, as may be the
case in Texas, there is no need to set up a forward capacity market (physical or nancial), which are
complex and costly to administer. Average V oLL pricing or an energy cum operating reserves market
are simple to set up and cause limited distortion compared to the optimum. Furthermore, an energy
cum operating reserves market remunerates exibility, an important issue which is not covered in this
work.
On the other-hand, policy makers may determine that generation is insu¢ ciently competitive in
their jurisdiction. This may be the case in European markets, where in most markets less than 10
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generation companies actually compete. This may also be the case where congestion on the trans-
mission grid separates the market in smaller submarkets, and producers may be able to exert local
market power. Then, policy makers should rst seek to increase competition among generators before
setting up a forward capacity market.
The article is structured as follows. Part I examines the causes of underinvestment. Section 2
presents the model structure and derives the optimal capacity. Section 3 estimates the impact of the
causes of underinvestment. Part II analyzes "dual markets" designs. Section 4 examines markets
for physical installed capacity certicates. Section 5 analyzes nancial reliability options. Part III
analyzes "energy only" market designs. Section 6 analyzes average V oLL pricing. Section 7 analyzes
the "energy cum operating reserves market". Finally, Section 8 suggests future research directions.
Technical proofs are included in the Appendix.
Part I
Underinvestment
2 Model structure
2.1 Uncertainty
Uncertainty is an essential feature of power markets. In this work, demand uncertainty is explicitly
modeled, while production uncertainty is taken into account implicitly through operating reserves
(presented in Section 7). This representation is suitable for markets that rely mostly on controllable
generation technologies, such as thermal and nuclear (see for example Chao and Wilson (1987)).
Extension to markets where intermittent sources constitute an important portion of the generation
portfolio are left for further work.
The number of possible states of the world is innite, and these are indexed by t 2 [0;+1). The
functions f (t) and F (t) are respectively the ex ante probability and cumulative density functions of
state t. Since all market participants have the same information about future demand projections and
construction plans, f (t) and F (t) are common to all stakeholders.
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2.2 Supply and demand
Supply This article considers a single generation technology, with marginal cost c > 0 and invest-
ment cost r. A single technology is su¢ cient to analyze total installed capacity, that depends solely
on the characteristics of the marginal technology (see for example Boiteux (1949) for the perfect
competition case and Zöttl (2011) for the imperfect competition case).
Underlying demand
Assumption 1 Customers all have the same load prole: denoting p the electric power price, all
customers have the same underlying demand D (p; t) in state t, up to a scaling factor.
Assumption 1 greatly simplies the derivations, while preserving the main economics insights.
Inverse demand is P (q; t) dened by D (P (q; t) ; t) = q, and gross consumers surplus is S (p; t) =R D(p;t)
0 P (q; t) dq.
Assumption 2 Properties of the inverse demand function3. For all t  0, Q  q  0: (i) Pt (Q; t) >
0, (ii) Pq (Q; t) < 0, (iii) Pq (Q; t) + qPqq (Q; t) < 0, (iv) Pt (Q; t) + qPqt (Q; t) > 0, and (v)
limQ!+1 P (Q; t) < c.
Assumption 2 (i) simply orders the states of the world by increasing demand, (ii) requires the
demand to be downward sloping, (iii) guarantees that marginal revenue is decreasing, (iv) requires
the marginal revenue to be increasing with the state of the world, and (v) requires the marginal value
of power to be lower than its marginal cost beyond some level. Assumption 2 holds for example if
the inverse demand is linear with constant slope: P (q; t) = a (t)  bq, where a (t) > 0, a0 (t) > 0, and
b > 0.
Constant price customers and curtailment Currently, only a fraction  > 0 of customers face
and react to real time wholesale price ("price reactive" customers), while the remaining fraction (1  )
of customers face constant price pR in all states of the world ("constant price" customers).
Since a fraction of customers does not react to real time price, there may be instances when the
SO has no alternative but to curtail demand, i.e., to interrupt supply.
3For any function f (x; y), fx (x; y) = @f@x (x; y), fxx (x; y) =
@2f
@x2
(x; y), and fxy (x; y) = @
2f
@x@y
(x; y).
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Assumption 3 The SO has the technical ability to curtail "constant price" consumers while not
curtailing "price reactive" customers.
Assumption 3 holds only partially today: most SOs can only organize curtailment by geographical
zones, and cannot di¤erentiate by type of customer. However, most price reactive customers are large
enough that they are connected directly to individual transformers, or to the high voltage grid, hence
they need not be curtailed when the SO curtail constant price customers. Assumption 3 will hold fully
in a few years, when "smart meters" are rolled out, as is mandated in most European countries and
many US states. SOs will then be able to di¤erentiate among adjacent customers, on the basis of the
information provided by power suppliers.
As discussed for example in Joskow and Tirole (2007), there exists multiple rationing technologies.
Curtailment is represented by a serving ratio  2 [0; 1]:  = 0 represents no serving (i.e., all energy to
all consumers is curtailed), while  = 1 represents full serving (i.e., no customer is curtailed). D (p; ; t)
is the demand for price p and serving ratio  in state t, that veries Dt (p; ; t) > 0. All rationing
technologies satisfy: (i) D (p; 0; t) = 0, (ii) @D@ > 0 for  2 [0; 1], and (iii) D (p; t)  D (p; 1; t)
and S (p; t)  S (p; 1; t) where S (p; ; t) = R D(p;;t)0 P (q; ; t) dq is the gross consumer surplus, and
P (q; ; t) is the inverse demand for a given serving ratio : D (P (q; ; t) ; ; t) = q. One veries that:
@S(p;;t)
@p = p
@D
@p .
When consumers are curtailed, the marginal Value of Lost Load (V oLL) represents the value they
place on an extra unit of electricity (Joskow and Tirole (2007), Stoft (2002)), formally dened as
v (p; ; t) =
@S
@
@D
@
(p; ; t) :
2.3 Socially optimal production and investment
The optimal production and investment is derived for example by for example Borenstein and Holland
(2005) and Joskow and Tirole (2007), and summarized below for the readers convenience.
Dene  (Q; t) the residual inverse demand curve with possible curtailment of constant price cus-
tomers
 (Q; t) = P
 
Q  (1  )D  pR; ; t

; t
!
(1)
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where  is the optimal serving ratio in state t for production Q.
Price reactive customers face the wholesale spot price  (Q; t), hence are never curtailed at the
optimum. O¤-peak, demand is low, and production Q (t) is determined by  (Q (t) ; t) = c. On-peak,
demand is set by installed capacity K, and the wholesale price is  (K; t).
As long as  (K; t)  v  pR; 1; t, constant price customers are not curtailed in state t. If  (K; t) >
v
 
pR; 1; t

, then,  < 1 is set to equalize constant price customersV oLL and the wholesale price:
v
 
pR; ; t

=  (K; t)
Dene bt (K) the rst state of the world when curtailment may occur4. Assumption 4 below insures
that, if curtailment occurs in state bt (K), it also occurs in all states t  bt (K). If curtailment never
occurs, bt (K)! +1.
Dene
	(K; c) =
Z +1
t(K;c)
( (K; t)  c) f (t) dt
where t (K; c) is the rst on-peak state of the world, where price equals marginal cost for production
K
 (K; t (K; c)) = c:
	(K; c) is the marginal social value capacity, decreasing in both arguments. We assume (c; r) are
such that there exists a solution to:
	(K; c) = r: (2)
The optimal capacity K is unique since 	(K; c) is decreasing in its rst argument. O¤-peak, as
long as capacity is not constrained, price equals marginal cost, hence marginal capacity generates no
economic prot. On-peak, when capacity is constrained, price exceeds marginal cost. The optimal
capacity is set such that the marginal social value capacity is exactly equal to the marginal capacity
cost r.
Additional assumptions on the inverse demand and rationing technology are required to ensure
4bt is a function of all the parameters. The notation bt (K) is used since the dependency on installed capacity K is the
most important in this analysis.
10
that  (K; t) satises Assumption 2, for which we use the following notation: if no rationing occurs,
q =
1
Pq

Q (1 )D(pR;t)
 ; t

; when rationing occurs, q =
@v
@K =
@v
@
@
@K .
Assumption 4 Properties of the inverse demand and rationing technology. For all t  0, Q  q  0,
 2 (0; 1] 0, pR > 0, and  2 (0; 1]: (i) the marginal revenue decreases as production increases,
q (Q; t) + qqq (Q; t) < 0, (ii) the marginal revenue increases as the state of the world increases,
t (Q; t)+qqt (Q; t) > 0, (iii) the V oLL decreases as the serving ratio increases,
@v
@  0 and increases
as the state of the world increases @v@t > 0, and (iv)



@D
@p
@v
@t +
@D
@t

+ (1  ) @D@t

> 0.
If no rationing occurs, Assumption 2 is su¢ cient to guarantee that t (Q; t) > 0, q (Q; t) < 0,
and limQ!+1  (Q; t) < c. However, if Pqq > 0, Pq (Q; t) + QPqq (Q; t) < 0 does not guarantee that
q (Q; t) +Qqq (Q; t) < 0. Additional conditions (i) and (ii) from Assumption 4 are required.
Suppose now rationing occurs for t  bt (K). As shown in Appendix A, @v@  0 guarantees that
@
@K > 0 and
@v
@K  0. Conditions (iii) and (iv) guarantee that the optimal serving ratio decreases as
the state of the world increases: @

@t < 0. If curtailment occurs in state bt, it also occurs in all states
t  bt. Furthermore, price increases as the state of the world increases: dvdt > 0. Finally, conditions (i)
and (ii) ensure that the second derivatives of v
 
pR; ; t

have the desired properties.
Assumption 4 holds for example if inverse demand is linear with constant slope: P (q; t) = a (t) bq
and rationing anticipated and proportional: S (p; ; t) = S (p; t) and D (p; ; t) = D (p; t). If no
rationing occurs,
 (Q; t) =
a (t)  bQ  (1  ) pR

(3)
is linear, hence satises conditions (i) and (ii).
Since rationing is anticipated and proportional,
v
 
pR; ; t

=
S
 
pR; t

D (pR; t)
= a (t)  bD
 
pR; t

2
=
a (t) + pR
2
: (4)
@v
@ = 0, and
@v
@t =
a
0
(t)
2 > 0, and v
 
pR; ; t

satises conditions (iii) to (v).
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3 Imperfect competition, price cap, and underinvestment
3.1 Capacity constrained Cournot competition under uncertainty
Consider now N producers, that play a two-stage game: in stage 1, producer n installs capacity kn; in
stage 2 he produces qn (t)  kn in the spot market in state t. Producers are assumed to compete à la
Cournot in the spot markets, facing inverse demand  (Q; t) dened by equation (1). Stage 2 can be
interpreted as a repetition of multiple states of the world over a given period (for example one year),
drawn from the distribution F (:).
The game is solved by backwards induction: producers rst compute prots from a Nash equi-
librium given installed capacities
 
k1; :::; kN

in the energy spot market for each state of the world
t; then they make their investment choice in stage 1 based on the expectation of these spot market
prots.
Q (t) =
NX
n=1
qn (t) and K =
NX
n=1
kn are respectively aggregate production in state t and aggregate
installed capacity. n (kn;k n) is producers n prot for the two-stage game.
As will be discussed, the results hold for other forms of imperfect competition in the spot market, as
long they yield an equilibrium price higher than the marginal cost c, and a prot function n (kn;k n)
with the required concavity. Cournot competition is used as it provides simple analytical expressions
that can be illustrated numerically.
To limit the exercise of market power, the SO may impose a cap pW on the wholesale power price5.
If she does, pW veries:
c+ r < pW   (0; 0) (5)
A price cap lower than the full marginal cost of the rst unit of energy would block any investment.
The upper bound on the price cap is su¢ cient to ensure existence of an equilibrium. The price cap
may be a formal cap, or the result of operational practices that depress prices (see Joskow (2007)).
t
 
K; pW

is the rst state of the world where the cap may be binding for production K:

 
K; t
 
K; pW

= pW :
5 In practice, most SOs in the United States impose a cap on bids into the wholesale markets, not a cap on wholesale
price. A wholesale price cap simplies the analysis, while preserving the main economic insights.
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If the price cap is never binding, t
 
K; pW
! +1.
KC is the equilibrium capacity referred to as the "Cournot" capacity in the following. tN (K) is
the rst on-peak state of the world under imperfect competition, i.e., where the marginal revenue for
production K equals marginal cost:

 
K; tN (K)

+
K
N
q
 
K; tN (K)

= c:
The aggregate capacity constraint may be binding before or after the price cap constraint in the
relevant range, i.e., tN (K) < t
 
K; pW

or tN (K)  t  K; pW . This issue is original to this analysis.
Zöttl (2011) does not include constant price customers, i.e., sets  = 1. Thus, with the values of the
parameters he estimates, only the case tN (K) < t
 
K; pW

occurs.
In this analysis, tN (K) > t
 
K; pW

is a distinct possibility, in particular if  (Q; t) is very inelastic,
i.e., if  is very low. We therefore derive in Appendix B the equilibrium investment if tN (K) >
t
 
K; pW

. Both cases yield the same economic insights, with slightly di¤erent equations. Only the
case tN (K)  t  K; pW  is presented here, since it is the only possibility under perfect competition
(limN!+1 tN (K) = t (K; c) < t
 
K; pW

), and is consistent with average V oLL pricing and operating
reserves pricing presented in Sections 6 and 7.
For states t  t  K; pW , producers face inverse demand  (K; t), while they face "horizontal"
inverse demand pW for t  t  K; pW . Imposition of the price cap pW leads to curtailment: since
both price reactive and constant price customers face a constant price, demand is perfectly inelastic.
Curtailment does not impact producersprot, since they already produce their maximum capacity
and receive pW . To simplify the notation, I assume that price reactive customers are never curtailed.
The social value of energy thus remains  (K; t).
Since  (K; t) veries Assumption 2, Zöttl (2011)s Proposition 1 applies: the prot function
n
 
K
N ; :::;
K
N

is concave, and there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium of the investment game
KC
N ; :::;
KC
N

dened by:


 
KC ; pW

= r (6)
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where


 
K; pW

=
Z t(K;pW )
tN (K)

 (K; t) +
K
N
q (K; t)  c

f (t) dt+
Z +1
t(K;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt (7)
= 	(K; c) +
K
N
Z t(K;pW )
tN (K)
q (K; t) f (t) dt 
Z tN (K)
t(K;c)
( (K; t)  c) f (t) dt 	  K; pW 
is the marginal value of capacity for a producer at the symmetric equilibrium. 
 (:) is decreasing in
its rst argument since n
 
K
N ; :::;
K
N

is concave.
Equation (7) illustrates the marginal value of capacity for producers. As in equation (2), only states
of the world where the aggregate capacity is binding (i.e., t  tN ) appear in equation (7): marginal
generation capacity remunerates its investment cost only when it is constrained. When capacity is
constrained but the price cap is not yet binding (i.e., tN (K)  t < t  K; pW ), adding a marginal
MW of generation capacity increases the capacity which receives margin per unit
 

 
KC ; t
  c and
decreases the margin on all inframarginal units K
C
N q
 
KC ; t

< 0. The net e¤ect is an increase in
prot, since 
 
KC ; tN
 
KC

+K
C
N q
 
KC ; tN
 
KC

= c and t (Q; t)+
Q
N qt (Q; t) > 0 by Assumption
4. When the price cap is binding (i.e., t  t  K; pW ), adding a marginal MW of generation generates
additional margin
 
pW   c.
3.2 Underinvestment and missing money
Observing that


 
K; pW
 	(K; c) = K
N
Z t(K;pW )
tN (K)
q (K; t) f (t) dt 
Z tN (K)
t(K;c)
( (K; t)  c) f (t) dt 	  K; pW 
illustrates the two distortions that reduce investment. First, imperfect competition reduces the mar-
ginal value of capacity by two terms: the reduction in prot on the inframarginal units as in all
Cournot competition models

K
N
R t(K;pW )
tN (K)
q (K; t) f (t) dt

, but also the lost margin ( (K; t)  c) in
the states of the world t 2 t (K; c) ; tN (K). Both e¤ects are negative. Second, the price cap reduces
the marginal value by 	
 
K; pW

: the SO values energy at  (K; t), while producers receive only
pW <  (K; t). This is the "missing money" discussed for example by Joskow (2007), and Cramton
and Stoft (2006).
The previous discussion can be summarized in the following Proposition:
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Proposition 1 Dene KC and KC
 
pW

respectively the Cournot capacity absent any price cap and
for price cap pW , and K
 
pW

the installed capacity under perfect competition for price cap pW .
Imperfect competition always reduce installed capacity, and, under perfect competition, a binding price
cap reduces installed capacity:
KC < K and KC
 
pW

< K
 
pW
  K
Proof. Suppose no price cap is imposed,

 (K) < 	(K; c) = r = 

 
KC
, K > KC
since 
 (:) is decreasing. Suppose now competition is perfect, and a cap is imposed,


 
K; pW

< 	(K; c) = r = 

 
K
 
pW

; pW
, K > K  pW  :
Finally, since 	
 
K
 
pW

; c
 	  K  pW  ; pW  = r,


 
K
 
pW

; pW

= r  
Z tN(K(pW ))
t(K(pW );c)
 

 
K
 
pW

; t
  c f (t) dt
+
K1
 
pW

N
Z t(K(pW );pW )
tN (K(pW ))
q
 
K
 
pW

; t

f (t) dt
< r = 

 
KC
 
pW

; pW

,
K
 
pW

> KC
 
pW

.
The price cap does not have a monotonic impact on the Cournot capacity: KC and KC
 
pW

cannot be compared in general. Zöttl (2011) proves that, if the price cap is su¢ ciently high, @K
C
@pW
< 0.
Conversely, Earle et al. (2007)) prove that if the price cap is su¢ ciently low, @K
C
@pW
> 0. In this article,
I take the price cap as given, and do not presume it is optimally chosen. Proposition 1 shows that,
for any binding price cap, investment is lower than socially optimal.
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Proposition 1 holds for any specication of the imperfect competition game in the spot market that
yields (i) a spot price higher than marginal cost, hence t (K; c)  tN (K), and (ii) a unique symmetric
equilibrium of the investment game, with a concave prot function n (k; :::; k).
3.3 Numerical illustration of underinvestment
Using a numerical example developed in Léautier (2012), we now compare the capacity reductions
caused by (i) a binding price cap (1   K
(pW )
K ), and (ii) imperfect competition absent any price cap
(1  KCK ).
The model is specied as follows: (i) inverse demand is linear: P (q; t) = a (t)   bq where a (t) =
a0 a1e 2t, (ii) states of the world are distributed according to f (t) = 1e 1t, and (iii) rationing is
anticipated and proportional. This specication provides an adequate representation of actual demand
(shape of load duration curve, and elasticity), while leading to simple expressions, as shown below.
In order to isolate the impact of curtailment (if it occurs), dene
 (K; c) =
Z +1
t(K;c)
"
P
 
K   (1  )D  pR; t

; t
!
  c
#
f (t) dt
the marginal social value of capacity if curtailment does not occur, and
I (K) =
Z +1
bt(K)
"
P
 
K   (1  )D  pR; t

; t
!
   (K; t)
#
f (t) dt:
the impact of curtailment. Equation (2) is then
	(K; c) =  (K; c)  I (K) = r:
Substituting in the residual inverse demand (3), then integrating by parts yields:
 (K; c) =
Z +1
t(K;c)
a
0
(t)

(1  F (t)) dt = a12

Z +1
t(K;c)
e (1+2)tdt
=
a1
 (1 + )
 
a0   bK   (c+ (1  ) pR)
a1
1+!
;
where  = 12 . Similarly, substituting in the residual inverse demand (3) and V oLL (4), then inte-
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grating by parts yields:
I (K) =
Z +1
bt(K)
 
a
0
(t)

  a
0
(t)
2
!
(1  F (t)) dt = a1 (2  )2

Z +1
bt(K) e (1+2)tdt
=
8><>:
(2 )a1
2(1+)

2b
a1(2 )
 
K  K1+ if K < K
0 otherwise
where b K = 2 2
 
a0   pR

. Curtailment occurs if and only if installed capacity is lower than the
threshold K. Then, its marginal impact is proportional to
 
K  K1+.
a0; a1, , and bQ1, where Q1 = a0 p0b is the maximum demand for price p0, are the parameters
to be estimated.  is estimated by Maximum Likelihood using the load duration curve for France in
2010. The same load duration curve provides an expression of a0 and a1 as a function of bQ1. The
average demand elasticity  is then used to estimate bQ1. As a base case, I choose  =  0:05 at price
p0 = 100 e=MWh, which is lower than most other studies, and the upper bound of Lijesen (2007)
estimates of real time price elasticity. As a robustness check, I use  =  0:01, which is the lower
bound of Lijesen (2007) estimates.
Following this procedure, Léautier (2012) estimates
for  =  0:058>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
bQ1 = 3 745 e=MWh
a0 = 3 845 e=MWh
a1 = 2 472 e=MWh
 = 1:78
and
for  =  0:018>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
bQ1 = 18 727 e=MWh
a0 = 18 827 e=MWh
a1 = 12 360 e=MWh
 = 1:78
:
Investment and operating costs are those of a Combined Cycle Gas Combustion Turbine, and
provided by the International Energy Agency (median case, IEA (2010)): c = 49 e=MWh and r = 8
e=MWh. The regulated price is pR = 100 e=MWh, consistent with most European power markets.
3.3.1 Perfect competition benchmark
Suppose rst the market is perfectly competitive (N ! +1, hence tN (K)! t (K; c)). 	(K; c) = r
is solved numerically for the optimal capacity K. For  =  0:05, curtailment of constant price
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customers no longer occurs after  = 10:0% of load is price responsive. K is decreasing with , as
illustrated on the table below:
 (%) 5 10 20
K=Q1 :958 :948 :935
For  =  0:01, curtailment of constant price customers no longer occurs after  = 4:6% of load is
price responsive. K () is presented on the table below:
 (%) 5 10 20
K=Q1 :976 :970 :961
If demand is more elastic (higher jj), optimal capacity is lower, thus curtailment occurs until a
higher fraction of demand is price responsive.
3.3.2 Capacity reduction due to missing money
We continue to assume that competition is perfect, i.e., N !1. Equation (6) then becomes:
	
 
K
 
pW

; c
 	  K  pW  ; pW  = r:
K
 
pW

is then determined numerically. For  =  0:05, a price cap pW = 3000 e=MWh, the
level in e¤ect in European wholesale markets, is never binding at the optimal capacity. Therefore,
the table below presents the relative capacity reduction

1  K
(pW )
K

for a much lower cap, maybe
resulting from operational practices, set at pW = 1 000 e=MWh, and for di¤erent values of :
 (%)
pW (e=MWh)
5 10 20
1000 0:9 0:5 0:1
For  =  0:01, a price cap pW = 3000 e=MWh is binding. The table below presents the relative
capacity reduction

1  K
(pW )
K

for pW = 1000 e=MWh and pW = 3000 e=MWh and for di¤erent
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values of :
 (%)
pW (e=MWh)
5 10 20
1000 2:3 1:8 1:2
3000 0:4 0:1 0:0
The tables above illustrate that the missing money has a small impact on installed capacity. Even
with demand elasticity at a lower end of estimates  =  0:01, a low price cap at pW = 1000 e=MWh
reduces investment by only 2:3% if  = 5%. We would have to assume pW = 500 e=MWh and
 = 1% for missing money to reduce capacity by 5:4%.
3.3.3 Capacity reduction due to imperfect competition
Suppose now no price cap is imposed. Given the specication of the demand function and the rationing
technology, bt (K) < tN (K) for the relevant values of the parameters. We prove in Appendix B that

 (K) =
Z +1
bt(K) (v (t)  c) f (t) dt:
Intuition can be obtained by letting pW ! +1 and observing q = vq = 0 for t  bt (K) in equation
(7). We then prove in Appendix B that

 (K) =

2b
(2  ) a1
 
K  KpR   c+ b
(2  )
 K + K
1 + 

:
We are now able to compare the relative capacity reduction attributable to imperfect competition
1  KCK

to the relative capacity reduction attributable to a price cap

1  K
(pW )
K

.
Consider rst the base case elasticity  =  0:05. As previously observed, a price cap set at pW = 3
000 e=MWh is never binding, hence all underinvestment is caused by strategic supply reduction.
Consider now pW = 1 000 e=MWh. The table below present the ratio

1  KCK

=

1  K
(pW )
K

for
di¤erent values of :
 (%)
pW (e=MWh)
3:9 5 10 20
1000 1 1:5 6:4 107:4
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As soon as   3:9%, strategic supply reduction is larger than reduction attributable to missing
money. For  = 5%, strategic underinvestment is 1:5 times more important than missing money.
Consider now the lower elasticity  =  0:01:
 (%)
pW (e=MWh)
2:7 5 6:9 10 20
1000 0:3 0:6 1 1:8 6:2
3000 1 3:1 6:6 19:0 68:2
A price cap pW = 3 000 e=MWh is binding for low values of . However, as soon as   2:7%,
strategic supply reduction is larger than reduction attributable to missing money. For  = 5%,
strategic underinvestment is 3:1 times more important than missing money. A much lower price cap
pW = 1 000 e=MWh is the main driver of underinvestment up to  = 6:9%.
These results are of course dependant on the joint specication of demand and uncertainty, and
on the parameters estimated, thus need to be validated using a richer specication. This is an im-
portant avenue for further research. Still, I believe these results will prove robust. The impact of
imperfect competition is not overstated. While Cournot competition is an extremely severe form of
imperfect competition, experience in England and Wales before 2000 and California in 2000=2001
suggest competition in power markets can be highly imperfect. Second, the impact of the price cap is
not understated. The joint specication of demand and uncertainty yields maximum oligopoly prices
higher than the price caps. For  = 5%, max = limt!+1 
 
KC ; t

is 4 000 e=MWh for  =  0:05
and 14 000 e=MWh for  =  0:01.
Thus, this analysis casts a di¤erent light on reliability in the power industry.
Part II
"Dual markets" designs
This part analyzes two "dual markets" designs: Installed Capacity Markets, where physical capacity
certicates are exchanged, and markets for nancial reliability options, that rely on nancial oblig-
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ations. To simplify the notation and analysis, operating reserves are ignored: as will be proven in
Section 7, including them would not modify the economic insights. All units (old and new) receive
the same compensation in these markets.
The timing is common to all "dual markets" designs:
1. The SO designs the rules of the energy and capacity (or options) markets. All parameters are
set
2. Producers sell physical capacity certicates or nancial reliability options, according to the rules
set up previously
3. Producers build new capacity if needed
4. The spot markets are played. In each state, producers compete à la Cournot facing  (Q; t),
given their installed capacity and their capacity obligation (physical or nancial)
Steps 2 and 3 can be inverted or simultaneous: generators rst build the plants, then sell physical
capacity certicates or nancial reliability options, or build and sell simultaneously. As proven below,
the analysis is identical for all three timings.
4 Physical capacity certicates
The SO imposes price cap pW on the energy markets and procures at least K physical capacity
certicates from producers. n and  =
NX
m=1
m are respectively the certicates sold by producer n
and the aggregate volume of certicates sold. In practice, SOs o¤er a "smoothed" (inverse) demand
curve:
H () =
8>>>><>>>>:
r if   K
h () if K <  < K + K
0 if   K + K
where (i) r, the capital cost of capacity, is the maximum price the SO is o¤ering for capacity, (ii)
 K > 0 is an arbitrary capacity increment, and (iii) h (:) is such that H (:) is C2, except maybe at
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K and K + K, h0 () < 0, 2h0 () + h00 () < 0 for all , and
h0 (K)  Nr
K
: (8)
As will be discussed below, condition (8) simplies the exposition, but is not essential. It is met in
practice. For example, Cramton and Ockenfels (2011) suggest a linear form for h (:) with 
K
K = 4%.
Condition (8) is then equivalent to N 
K
K  1, and holds as long as less than 25 producers compete.
Proposition 2 If the SO imposes and monitors that the installed capacity exceeds the capacity certi-
cates sold by each generator: kn  n, then (i) producers issue as many credits as they install capacity,
and (ii) Kis the unique symmetric equilibrium investment level. Compared to the no installed capacity
market situation, producers prot and overall welfare are increased.
Proof. The full proof is presented in Appendix C. Existence of a physical capacity certicates market
alone does not alter investment incentives. The SO must impose kn  n, otherwise KC remains the
installed capacity.
If she does, producers sell exactly as many certicates as they have installed capacity (or install
exactly as much capacity as they have sold certicates) since incremental capacity is unprotable unless
it collects capacity markets revenues. Then, since kn = n at the equilibrium, producer n program is:
max
kn
nCM (k
n ;k n; ) = n (kn ;k n) + knH (K)
Given the shape of the inverse demand function H (:), kn = K

N for all n is the unique symmetric
equilibrium, and producersprot is:
nCM

K
N
; :::;
K
N

= n

K
N
; :::;
K
N

+
K
N
r:
Then, since n (k; :::; k) is concave and KC  K:
n

KC
N
; :::;
KC
N

 n

K
N
; :::;
K
N

+

KC  K
N

@n
@k

K
N
; :::;
K
N

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,nCM

K
N
; :::;
K
N

 n

KC
N
; :::;
KC
N

  K
C
N
@n
@k

K
N
; :::;
K
N

+
K
N

@n
@k

K
N
; :::;
K
N

+ r

> n

KC
N
; :::;
KC
N

since @
n
@k
 
K
N ; :::;
K
N

< 0 and @
n
@k
 
K
N ; :::;
K
N

+ r = 
(K) > 0.
Producers prots increase compare to the no installed capacity market situation. Finally, since
overall welfare W (K) increases up to to K = K, W (K) W  KC.
Capacity markets do not automatically restore investment incentives. The SO must ensure that
producers cannot sell short, i.e., sell more certicates than their installed capacity. This observation
is by now well accepted by economists, policy makers, and SOs. It has been articulated for example
by Wolak (2006). As a result, SOs monitor that existing generation assets providing certicates are
still operational, and that planned capacity having received certicates has indeed be installed. SOs
then impose a penalty on producers that, when requested, do not o¤er in the spot market energy up
to the certicates they have sold forward. This monitoring process is extremely expensive.
Matters are slightly di¤erent in this model, since producers exercise market power by reducing
capacity ex ante, and not by withholding output on-peak. Spot-market penalty is replaced in this
model by an obligation not to sell certicates short, i.e., to control more physical capacity (existing
or planned) than certicates sold.
Physical capacity markets increase overall welfare, and also increase transfers from customers to
producers. To my best knowledge, this result is original to this work. It is also very general. Denote
KE (not necessarily equal to K) the equilibrium capacity including the certicates markets. As long
as n (k; :::;K) is concave, and KE > KC , the marginal value of capacity at the KE is negative:
@n
@k

KE
N ; :::;
KE
N

< 0. The equilibrium price in the capacity market (r in this case) must compensate
for this negative marginal value, otherwiseKE would not be an equilibrium: @
n
@k

KE
N ; :::;
KE
N

+r  0.
This is su¢ cient for the proof.
Coupled with the underinvestment analysis of Part I, Proposition 2 casts a new light on physi-
cal certicates markets: the common wisdom is that these markets are required to compensate the
missing money. If, as suggested by the illustrative numerical example presented in Part I, strategic
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supply reduction is indeed the main driver of underinvestment, physical certicates markets then sur-
remunerate this strategic behavior. This suggests that competition authorities should play a greater
role than SOs in alleviating underinvestment.
If condition 8 is not met, the aggregate capacity at the unique symmetric equilibrium is KCCM 2 
K;K + K

. Welfare increases if and only if  K is small enough that W
 
K + K
 W  KC.
5 Financial reliability options
Financial contracts constitute another approach to alleviate underinvestment. This Section examines
nancial reliability options, proposed by Cramton and Stoft (2006 and 2008), and more recently
Cramton and Ockenfels (2011). Options and not forward contracts are the nancial instruments
analyzed here, since Chao and Wilson (2005), that examine a slightly di¤erent option design, argue
that options are in general preferable. These options constitute an insurance against spot energy
prices higher than a pre-agreed strike price pS , sold by producers to customers. If the spot price p (t)
is lower than pS , producer n does not make any payment. If p (t) > pS , producer n pays
 
p (t)  pS
times a fraction of the realized demand equal to his fraction of the total options sale.
The SO does not impose a cap on wholesale prices, and runs an auction for nancial reliability
options. n and  =
NX
m=1
m are respectively the options sold by producer n and the aggregate volume
of options sold. The notation is identical to the capacity market case, except that the subscript RO
is added when appropriate. A very simple auction setup is assumed, similar to the one suggested by
Cramton and Stoft (2008): the SO determines the volume she desires to purchase, assumed to be
K, sets the capital cost of capacity r as the reserve price for the auction, and proposes a downward
sloping inverse demand curve for options:
HRO () =
8>>>><>>>>:
r if   K
hRO () if K
 <  < K + KRO
0 if   K + KRO
where (i)  KRO > 0 is an arbitrary capacity increment, and (ii) hRO (:) is such that HRO (:) is C2,
except maybe at K and K +  K, h0RO () < 0, 2h
0
RO () + h
00
RO () < 0 for all , and hRO (:)
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veries condition (8). To limit the potential exercise of market power, Cramton and Ockenfels (2011)
propose the SO impose n  kn: all capacity must be committed forward through option sales.
We assume pS satises
	
 
KC
 
pS

; pS
  r: (9)
Condition (9) simplies the exposition, as it guarantees that  = K is the unique equilibrium of the
options market. As shown by Zöttl (2011), if pS is high enough, @K
C
@pS
 0, thus KC  pS converges,
and limpS!+1	
 
KC
 
pS

; pS

= 0. Condition (9) is met for pS high enough.
When the spot price exceeds the strike price, price-reactive consumers then pay pS as the e¤ective
price, i.e., they know when making their consumption decision they receive rebatemax
 
 (Q; t)  pS ; 0
per unit of energy purchased. Then, actual demand does not depend on the spot price, which leads
to rationing.
As previously, t
 
K; pS

is the rst state of the world where the spot price exceeds the strike price,
and is dened by 
 
K; t
 
K; pS

= pS . The capacity constraint is assumed to be binding before the
spot price reaches the option price: tN (K)  t  K; pS.
Chao and Wilson (2005) examine a slightly di¤erent market structure: they consider physical
options paired (or not) with a complementary price insurance, and compute the linear supply function
equilibrium for options forward sales and power spot sales. Their ndings are aligned with those
presented below.
5.1 Expected prots with nancial reliability options
The producers prot function is characterized below:
Lemma 1 The expected prot of producer n is:
nRO (k
n ; n ;k n; n) = nHRO () + n (kn ;k n) +

kn   
n

K

	
 
K; pS

(10)
with the convention that pS acts as the price cap in n.
Proof. Producer n receives the revenues from options sale nHRO (), plus prots from the energy
market. A possible decomposition is as follows: rst, the producer receives prot n (kn ;k n) pre-
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viously computed, assuming a price cap at pS. Second, since there is no price cap, he receives the
di¤erence between the spot price  (K; t) and the cap pS for every unit produced when the price exceeds
pS. Since we have assumed tN (K)  t  K; pS, he produces his entire capacity kn, hence he receives
kn
R +1
t(K;pS)
 
 (K; t)  pS f (t) dt = kn	  K; pS.
Finally, when the spot price exceeds the strike price pS, each generator must pay
 
 (K; t)  pS
times his fraction 
n
 of the total demand. Since we have assumed t
N (K)  t  K; pS, total demand
is equal to total capacity K and the payment is proportional to 
n
 K. Total expected payment from
generator n is thus: 
n
 K
R +1
t(K;pS)
 
 (K; t)  pS f (t) dt = n 	  K; pS. Summing these terms yields
equation (10).
The prot realized in states higher than t
 
K; pS

is nRO (K; t) = k
n
  
1  n Kkn

 (K; t) + 
n

K
kn p
S   c.
Producers face a weighted average of the spot price and the option price, hence are less sensitive to
an increase in spot price. Consistent with Allaz and Villa (1993) and Chao and Wilson (2005), a
producer holding forward contracts faces lower incentives to exert market power in the spot market.
5.2 Equilibrium capacity with nancial reliability options
Proposition 3 Reliability options reduce but do not solve the underinvestment problem. KCRO, the
unique symmetric equilibrium of the options and investment game, veries:
KC
 
pS
  KCRO < K
with equality occurring when N = 1.
Proof. Appendix D proves that, if producers invest rst then sell options, there exists a unique
symmetric equilibrium. If producers sell options rst, then invest, we assume existence of a symmetric
equilibrium, then prove its unicity. In all cases, equilibrium capacity satises:
@nRO
@kn

KCRO
N
; :::;
KCRO
N

= 

 
KCRO; p
S
  r + N   1
N
	
 
KCRO; p
S

= 0 (11)
Then,


 
KCRO; p
S

= r   N   1
N
	
 
KCRO; p
S
  r:
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Hence KCRO  KC
 
pS

. Then,
@nRO
@kn

K
N
; :::;
K
N

=  
Z tN (K)
t(K;c)
( (K; t)  c) f (t) dt+ K

N
Z t(K;pS)
tN (K)
q (K
; t) f (t) dt
  1
N
	
 
K; pS

< 0:
Then K > KCRO since we prove in Appendix D that 
n
RO
 
K
N ; :::;
K
N

is concave.
For N > 1, reliability options are more e¤ective than physical certicates: the resulting installed
capacity is higher than the Cournot capacity, while physical certicates alone (i.e., without the added
no short sale obligation) have no impact on installed capacity. However, reliability options are not
su¢ cient to restore optimal investment incentives.
This result may appear surprising, since reliability options impose a penalty of
 
 (K; t)  pS on
each unit a producer is "short" energy. However, a closer examination of the mechanism reveals that,
at the symmetric equilibrium, this penalty represents only N 1N
 
 (K; t)  pS, which is not su¢ cient
to fully compensate for the "missing money"
 
 (K; t)  pS.
Proposition 3 mirrors Allaz and Villa (1993) analysis of the interaction between spot and forward
markets: assuming Cournot competition in both, they show that introducing forward markets reduces
but does not eliminate market power, and has not impact on a monopoly (N = 1).
5.3 Equivalence between the two "dual markets" designs when "no short sale"
condition is added
Proposition 4 If (i) the SO imposes and monitors that the installed capacity exceeds the options sold
by each generator: n  kn, (ii) the wholesale price cap in the capacity market is set equal to the strike
price of the reliability option
 
pS = pW

and satises condition (9), and (iii) the demand functions for
reliability options and for capacity credits are identical and satisfy condition (8), then (i) producers
sell as many options as they install capacity, and (ii) both market designs yield the same symmetric
equilibrium.
Proof. The proof of the rst point is identical to that of Proposition 2. Then, substituting n = kn
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into equation (10) yields:
nRO (k
n ;k n) = n (kn ;k n) + knHRO (K)
Hence, nRO = 
n
CM if p
S = pW and HRO (:) = H (:). Hence the equilibria are identical.
As mentioned earlier, since producers sell exactly as many options as their installed capacity
(or install as much capacity as they sold options), the prot net of the payment on the option is
equivalent to a cap on prices. Therefore, if the "technical parameters" are identical, both approaches
are equivalent. Policy-makers considering implementing them should therefore select one or the other
approach based on other factors not included in this analysis.
Part III
"Energy-only" market designs
6 Average V oLL pricing
Hogan (2005) describes average V oLL pricing as follows: the SO approximates the true demand curve
by valuing all lost load from constant price customers at average V oLL v, determined exogenously.
Thus, when load is shed, producers receive average V oLL v. Estimates of average V oLL range between
between 10 000 and 20 000 e=MWh. Does this mechanism restore investment incentives?
Average V oLL pricing has limited impact on strategic supply reduction: if generation is imperfectly
competitive, underinvestment will remain, although it may be slightly reduced as shown by Zöttl
(2011).
Consider now the perfectly competitive case. The analysis presented in Section 3 proves that, since
average V oLL is a cap on wholesale prices, it reduces investment incentives. However, the cap is high
enough that the distortion is negligible.
Underinvestment arises since, when curtailment must occur, producers receive v which is by con-
struction lower than the true marginal value of energy  (K; t). What if the SO sets v exactly at the
28
average V oLL, conditional on curtailment occurring? This approach is suggested Stoft (2002, pages
136-138 and 157-159):
"the regulator acts as a surrogate for load by setting the price when power is being shed.
The appropriate price equals the average value that shed load places on power".
This question is of course theoretical, as computing V oLL, let alone average V oLL conditional
on curtailment, is impossible in practice. Even if the SO could compute the correct average V oLL,
underinvestment would still occur, as proven below:
When curtailment occurs, producers receive the average V oLL, which eliminates the wedge between
private and public values. However, the prot function is discontinuous at t^ (K), the rst state
when curtailment occurs: just before t^ (K), producers receive 
 
K; t^ (K)

. Immediately after t^ (K),
producers receive v. Since v is the average V oLL over states of the world higher than t^ (K), v >

 
K; t^ (K)

. This induces under-investment: a marginal increase in capacity reduces the occurrence
of curtailment, hence increases t^ (K), thus producers receive negative margin
 

 
K; t^ (K)
  v on
these states of the world. This point is formally proven in Appendix E. The impact however, is likely
to be small.
7 Energy cum operating reserves market
SOs must secure operating reserves to protect the system against catastrophic failure. Hogan (2005)
suggests that remuneration of these operating reserves can solve the missing money problem.
The representation of operating reserves is that of Borenstein and Holland (2005). For simplicity,
only one type of reserves is considered, the non-spinning one (i.e., plants that are not running, but can
start up and produce energy within a short pre-agreed time frame). Since the plant is not running,
the marginal cost of providing reserves is normalized to zero. In reality, SOs run multiple markets
for operating reserves, for example, spinning, 10-minutes, 30-minutes. The economic insights are not
modied, as long as the no-arbitrage condition presented below holds.
Hogan (2005) proposes that the SO runs a single market for energy and operating reserves. Gener-
ating units called to produce receive the wholesale price w (t), generating units that provide operating
reserves receive the wholesale price w (t) less the marginal cost of generation c, assumed to be per-
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fectly known by the SO. Generators are therefore indi¤erent between producing energy or providing
reserves, an essential condition (Borenstein and Holland (2005)). When an unscheduled generation
outage occurs, operating reserves produce energy and receive the full price w (t).
Operating reserves requirements are expressed as a percentage of demand, denoted h (t), and taken
as given here6. Dening the optimal h (t) is beyond the scope of this work. Joskow and Tirole (2007)
show the optimal reserve ratio increases with the state of the world; hence h (t) is assumed to be
nondecreasing.
The retail price p (t) must be higher than wholesale price w (t) to cover generatorsrevenues from
the operating reserves market. A natural choice is to directly include the cost of reserves in the retail
price faced by "price reactive" customers7:
p (t) = w (t) + h (t) (w (t)  c)
,
p (t)  c = (1 + h (t)) (w (t)  c) (12)
Throughout this section, the retail and wholesale prices are assumed to be related by equation (12).
The notation and model structure are identical to the previous Sections, except that the subscript OR
is added when appropriate.
Only the fraction 11+h(t) of installed capacity is used to meet demand in state t, hence
K
1+h(t) and
not K is the output appearing in the function  (:; t). Thus, the marginal social value of capacity in
state t is
w (K; t)  c = p (t)  c
1 + h (t)
=


K
1+h(t) ; t

  c
1 + h (t)
:
The marginal social value of capacity is
	OR (K) =
Z +1
tOR(K;c)


K
1+h(t) ; t

  c
1 + h (t)
f (t) dt
6 In practice, various metrics for operating reserves are used, including absolute values expressed in MW . Expressing
reserves as a percentage of peak demand simplies the analysis while preserving the main economic intuition.
7Borenstein and Holland (2005) show it to be the perfect competition outcome.
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where tOR (K; c) is uniquely dened8 by 

K
1+h(t) ;
tOR (K; c)

= c.
Consider now the producersproblem. By construction, producers are indi¤erent between produc-
ing energy or providing reserves. In state t, they o¤er sn (t) into the energy cum operating reserves
market. S (t) =
PN
n=1 s
n (t) is the total o¤er. Energy available to meet demand is Q (t) = S(t)1+h(t) . The
SO then (i) veries that sn (t)  kn, and (ii) allocates each sn (t) between energy qn (t) and reserves
bn (t). Producer n prot is then:
n (t) = (qn (t) + bn (t)) (w (t)  c)
=
sn (t)
1 + h (t)



S (t)
1 + h (t)

  c

since (i) energy and operating reserves receive same net revenue by construction, and (ii) wholesale
(w (t)) and retail



S(t)
1+h(t)

prices are linked by equation (12). The problem is then isomorphic to
the previous Sections, except that s
n(t)
1+h(t) replaces production q
n (t).
tNOR (K), the rst on-peak state of the world under imperfect competition, is uniquely dened
9 by


K
1+h(t) ; t

+ 1N
K
1+h(t)

K
1+h(t) ; t

= c.
The SO imposes a wholesale price cap v equal to the best estimate of V oLL. tOR (K; v), the rst
state of the world where the cap may be binding, is uniquely dened by 

K
1+h(t) ;
tOR (K; v)

= v.
As in the previous Sections, v is assumed to be binding after the capacity constraint under imperfect
competition: tNOR (K)  tOR (K; v). The inverse demand function for producers is then: 

K
1+h(t) ; t

as long as price cap is not reached, and a horizontal inverse demand at v afterwards.
Anticipating on the next Lemma, the marginal value of capacity for a producer at the symmetric
equilibrium is

OR (K) = 	OR (K; c) 	OR (K; v) 
Z tNOR(K)
tOR(K;c)


K
1+h(t) ; t

  c
1 + h (t)
f (t) dt
+
1
N
Z tOR(K;v)
tNOR(K)
K
1 + h (t)
q

K
1 + h (t)
; t

f (t) dt
8Since h (t) is nondecreasing, m1 (K; t) = 

K
1+h(t)
; t

is increasing in t: @m1
@t
=  q Kh
0(t)
(1+h(t))2
+ t > 0.
9Similarly, m2 (t) = 

K
1+h(t)
; t

+ 1
N
K
1+h(t)


K
1+h(t)
; t

is increasing in t since m02 (t) =
 

N+1
N
q +
1
N
K
1+h(t)
qq

Kh0(t)
(1+h(t))2
+ t > 0.
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Lemma 2 The socially optimal capacity KOR for a energy-cum-operating reserves market is dened
by:
	OR (K

OR) = r (13)
There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium for which each generator invests kCOR =
KCOR
N dened
by:

OR
 
KCOR

= r (14)
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix F.
Proposition 5 If the SO runs an energy cum operating reserves market and imposes a price cap v,
underinvestment occurs unless (i) generation is perfectly competitive, and (ii) the price cap is never
expected to be binding.
Proof. The result follows immediately from equations (14) and (13).
Including an operating reserve market leads to the same investment incentives as average V oLL
pricing. This result is surprising: one would have expected the operating reserves market to alleviate
the missing money problem, since (i) all producing units receive a higher price, and (ii) units providing
capacity but not energy are remunerated.
However, Lemma 2 shows these two e¤ects are already included in the determination of the socially
and privately optimal capacities KOR and K
C
OR. Then, units providing reserve capacity receive the
same prot (w (t)  c) as units producing electricity, to avoid arbitrage between markets. No addi-
tional prot is generated. The operating reserves market remunerates reserves, which are needed, not
capacity investment.
8 Conclusion
This article formally analyzes the causes of underinvestment, and the various corrective market de-
signs that have been proposed and implemented. It yields four main analytical ndings. First, using
a simple numerical example, (a linear demand function, calibrated on the French power load duration
curve), strategic supply reduction is shown to be a more important cause of underinvestment than
the imposition of a price cap. For example, a 3 000 e=MWh price cap, which is the current level in
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European markets, is shown to never be binding at the optimal capacity. Any underinvestment would
thus be entirely caused by strategic supply reduction. If a low 1 000 e=MWh price cap is imposed,
strategic supply reduction is the primary cause of underinvestment as soon as more than 3:9% of the
load is price responsive. Second, physical capacity certicates markets implemented in the United
States restore optimal investment, but increase producersprots beyond the imperfect competition
level. Third, nancial reliability options, proposed in many markets, fail to restore investment incen-
tives. If a "no short sale" condition is added, they are equivalent to physical capacity certicates.
Finally, if competition is perfect, energy only markets yield a negligible underinvestment compared
to the optimum. Taken together, these ndings suggest that, to ensure generation adequacy, policy
makers should put more e¤ort on enforcing competitive behavior in the energy markets, and less on
designing additional markets.
These results provide a sound basis for policy makers decision making. Di¤erent avenues for
further work would increase their applicability. First, conrm for other specications of demand the
importance of imperfect competition in leading to a binding price cap.
Second, expand the economic models to other types of technologies: (i) intermittent and uncon-
trollable production technologies such as photovoltaic and on- and o¤-shore wind mills, which will
provide an increasingly important share of power supply; (ii) reservoir hydro production, which has
almost zero marginal cost, but limited overall production capacity, and (iii) voluntary curtailment,
i.e., consumers reducing their consumption upon the SOs request.
Finally, expand the model to multiple investment periods. Observation suggests the power industry,
like many capital-intensive industries, displays cycle of over- and under-investment ("boom bust"
cycles). Understanding how various market designs perform in a dynamic setting is therefore extremely
important.
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A Properties of the V oLL
When capacity is constrained and if curtailment occurs, total di¤erentiation of the energy balance
K = D
 
v
 
pR; ; t

; t

+ (1  )D  pR; ; t
with respect to K yields
@
@K
=
1
@D@p
@v
@ + (1  ) @D@
:
@v
@  0 guarantees that @

@K > 0 and
@v
@K =
@v
@
@
@K  0.
Total di¤erentiation of the energy balance with respect to t yields
@
@t
=  


@D
@p
@v
@t +
@D
@t

+ (1  ) @D@t
@D@p
@v
@ + (1  ) @D@
:
Conditions (iii) and (iv) guarantee that the optimal serving ratio decreases as the state of the world
increases: @

@t < 0. If curtailment occurs in state bt, it also occurs in all states t  bt. Furthermore,
price increases as the state of the world increases:
dv
dt
=
@v
@
@
@t
+
@v
@t
> 0:
B Equilibrium capacity when price constraint binds before the ca-
pacity constraint
B.1 General demand function
Technical supplement G derives the equilibrium capacity when the capacity constraint binds before
the price cap constraint, i.e., tN (K)  t  K; pW  in the relevant range for K. In all the derivations,
we also ignore the possibility that curtailment of constant price customers occurs before the capacity
constraint, i.e., bt (K) < tN (K). If v  pR; ; t does not depend on capacity K, for example if rationing
is anticipated and proportional, 
 (K) may be modied.
We examine both possibilities in this Appendix. Denote  (t) the maximum possible price. If
we consider a constant price cap,  (t) = pW . If we consider anticipated and proportional rationing,
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 (t) = v (t).
Consider N producers, each with installed capacity kn, ordered such that k1  :::  kN . Lemma
3 presented in Technical supplement G characterizes the equilibrium of the energy markets as follows:
there exists N critical states of the world 0  t1  t2  :::  tN such that, for t 2 [tj ; tj+1 ], all
producers i  j produce their entire capacity ki, while all producers n > j produce j+1 (k1 ; :::; kj ; t)
dened on [tj ; tj+1 ] as the solution of a "modied Cournot condition":

 
jX
i=1
ki + (N   j)j+1 ; t
!
  c+ j+1q
 
jX
i=1
ki + (N   j)j+1 ; t
!
= 0:
bQ (t) = Pji=1 ki + (N   j)j+1 (t) is increasing in t. For t  tN , all producers produce their entire
capacity kn, hence bQ (t) =PNn=1 kn.
Since we are ultimately looking for a symmetric equilibrium, suppose the price cap is binding
before t1, i.e., there exists bt 2 0; t1 such that  bQ  bt ;bt =   bt.
Assumption 5 1. If there exists bt 2 0; t1 such that  bQ  bt ;bt =   bt, then  bQ (t) ; t >  (t)
for all t > bt.
2.  (0; t) > v (t) for all t  0.
The rst part of Assumption 5 greatly simplies the derivation of the equilibrium, but may not
be essential. It holds if t (Q; t)   qqt (Q; t) > 0 for Q  q  0. The second part of Assumption 5
guarantees the existence of an equilibrium.
Dene ~q1 (t) by 
 
N ~q1 (t) ; t

=  (t). qn = ~q1 (t) for all n  1 is the unique equilibrium on  bt; ~t1.
To prove the result, rst observe that ~q1 (t) >
bQ(t)
N since

 
N ~q1 (t) ; t

=  (t) < 
 bQ (t) ; t :
This is the classical result: in each state of the world, a price cap reduces rmsability to reduce
output. Suppose all rms n > 1 produce ~q1 (t), while rm 1 considers deviating. A negative deviation
is unprotable since it reduces output but cannot increase price, which is capped at v (t). Then, since
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~q1 (t) >
bQ(t)
N and the marginal revenue is decreasing,
@1
@q1
 
~q1 (t) ; :::; ~q1 (t) ; t

= 
 
N ~q1 (t) ; t

+ ~q1 (t) q
 
N ~q1 (t) ; t
  c
< 
 bQ (t) ; t+ bQ (t)
N
q
 bQ (t) ; t  c = @n
@qn
 bQ (t)
N
; :::;
bQ (t)
N
; t
!
= 0:
A positive deviation is not protable. qn = ~q1 (t) for all n  1 is a symmetric equilibrium. Since the
prot function is concave, this equilibrium is unique.
When t = ~t1 characterized by ~q1 (t) = k1 ()   Nk1; t1 =   t1, producer 1 is constrained.
Similarly, for t 2 ~tj ; ~tj+1 for j = 1; :::; N   1, the unique symmetric equilibrium for the (N   j)
remaining producers is qn = (N   j) ~qj+1 (t) where 
Pj
i=1 k
i + (N   j) ~qj+1 (t) ; t

=  (t).
Consider now producer n expected prot, given capacities k1  :::  kN , and the structure of the
equilibrium described above:
n (kn;k n) =
Z bt
0
1



Q^

  c

f (t) dt+
Z ~t1
bt ~q1 (t) ( (t)  c) f (t) dt
+
n 1X
i=1
Z ~ti+1
~ti
~qi+1 (t) ( (t)  c) f (t) dt+ kn
Z +1
~tn
( (t)  c) f (t) dt  r

:
Thus, for all n  N ,
@n
@kn
=
Z +1
~tn
( (t)  c) f (t) dt  r
since output is continuous, and
@2n
(@kn)2
=      ~tn  c f  ~tn @~tn
@kn
< 0:
If there exists K such that
@n
@kn

K
N
; :::;
K
N

=
Z +1
et(K) ( (t)  c) f (t) dt  r = 0
where et (K) is such that   K;et (K) =   et (K), then KN for all n = 1; :::; N is the unique sym-
metric equilibrium. For any t  0, limK!+1  (K; t) < c, thus limK!+1 et (K) = +1, hence
limK!+1 @
n
@kn
 
K
N ; :::;
K
N

=  r < 0.
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To prove that @
n
@kn (0; :::; 0) > 0, we need to consider separately a price cap and rationing. Consider
rst a price cap pW . Since  (0; t)  pW for all t 0 by condition (5), t  0; pW  = 0 and
@n
@kn
(0; :::; 0) =
Z +1
0
 
pW   c f (t) dt  r = pW   (c+ r) > 0
by condition (5).
Consider now rationing. The second part of Assumption 5 implies that bt (0) = 0, thus
@n
@kn
(0; :::; 0) =
Z +1
0
(v (t)  c) f (t) dt  r 
Z +1
0
( (K; t)  c) f (t) dt  r > 	(K; t)  r = 0:
Thus, in both cases, @
n
@kn (0; :::; 0) > 0. There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium.
If the price constraint is a price cap  (t) = pW , et (K) = t  K; pW , and


 
K; pW

=
Z +1
t(K;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt = 	(K; c) 	  K; pW  :
If the price constraint is curtailment of constant price customers,  (t) = v (t), et (K) = bt (K), and

 (K) =
Z +1
bt(K) (v (t)  c) f (t) dt = 	(K; c) 
Z bt(K)
t(K;c)
( (t)  c) f (t) dt:
In both cases, the Cournot capacity KC does not appear to depend on the number of competing
rms N . The dependence is in fact embedded in the constraint et (K) < tN (K). This point will be
illustrated on the specic case of linear demand examined below.
B.2 Linear inverse demand function
Suppose inverse demand is  (Q; t) = a(t) bQ (1 )p
R
 . The rst part of Assumption 5 is met, since
qt = 0. t
N (K) is dened by
a
 
tN (K)

=
N + 1
N
bK + (1  ) pR + c;
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while t
 
K; pW

is dened by
a
 
t
 
K; pW

= bK + (1  ) pR + pW ;
and bt (K) by
a
 bt (K) = 2
2  bK + p
R:
Thus,
tN (K)  t  K; pW , bK
N
   pW   c
and
tN (K)  bt (K), bK
N

1
N
  
2  

   pR   c :
With the numerical values estimated, and for N  10, which is the case of interest, tN (K) > t  K; pW 
and tN (K) > bt (K) for all relevant values of K for   0:2.
Suppose now no price cap is imposed. Since bt (K) < tN (K),

 (K) =
Z +1
bt(K) (v (t)  c) f (t) dt:
Integration by parts yields

 (K) =
 
1  F  bt (K)  v  bt (K)  c+ Z +1bt(K) @v@t (t) (1  F (t)) dt:
 
1  F  bt (K) =  2b
a1 (2  )
 
K  K ;
hence  
1  F  bt (K)  v  bt (K)  c =  2b
a1 (2  )
 
K  KpR   c+ bK
2  

:
Z +1
bt(K)
@v
@t
(t) (1  F (t)) dt = 
2  I (K) =
a1
2 (1 + )

2b
a1 (2  )
 
K  K1+ ;
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thus

 (K) =

2b
(2  ) a1
 
K  KpR   c+ b
(2  )
 K + K
1 + 

:
C Physical capacity certicates
C.1 No short sale condition
Suppose rst the SO imposes no condition on certicates sales. Producer ns expected prot, including
revenues from the capacity market is: nCM
 
kn ; n ;k n; n

= n (kn ;k n) + nH (). Since n
does not enter n (kn ;k n),
@nCM
@kn

K
N
; :::;
K
N

=
@n
@kn

K
N
; :::;
K
N

:
the certicate market has no impact on equilibrium investment.
Suppose now the SO imposes kn  n . Consider the case where producers rst sell credits, then
install capacity. When selecting capacity, each producer maximizes nCM (kn;k n) subject to kn  n .
The rst-order condition is then:
@Ln
@kn
=
@ n
@kn
+ n1
where n1 is the shadow cost of the constraint kn  n . Suppose rst ^n < k^n 8n, then n1 = 0 8n
and k^n = K
C
N at the symmetric equilibrium. When selecting the amount of credits sold, the producers
then maximize nH (). Given the shape of H (:), the symmetric equilibrium is ^
n  KN . But then,
KC >   K, which is a contradiction, hence ^n = k^n .
Consider now the case where producers rst build capacity, then sell credits. The proof proceeds
along the same lines. At the second stage, producers maximize nH () subject to n  kn . If
^
n
< k^n 8n, the symmetric equilibrium is ^n  KN , hence ^  K. Then, when selecting capacity,
producers maximize n (kn ;k n), hence the equilibrium installed capacity is K^ = KC . But then,
KC > ^  K, which is a contradiction, hence ^n = k^n .
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C.2 Equilibrium investment with physical capacity certicates market
Since kn = n at the equilibrium, producer n program is:
max
kn
nCM (k
n ;k n; ) = n (kn ;k n) + knH (K)
We prove that
 
K
N ; :::;
K
N

is the unique symmetric equilibrium. Consider rst a negative deviation,
i.e., k1 < K

N while k
n = K

N for all n > 1. Since K = k
1 + N 1N K
 < K,
@1CM
@k1

k1 ;
K
N
; :::;
K
N

=
@1
@k1

k1 ;
K
N
; :::;
K
N

+ r:
Analysis of the two-stage Cournot game (Zöttl (2001), presented in the technical supplement G yields:
@1
@k1

k1 ;
K
N
; :::;
K
N

=
Z tN (K)
t1
 


Q^ (k1 ; t)

+ k1q

Q^ (k1 ; t)
 @Q^
@k1
  c
!
f (t) dt (15)
+
Z t(K;pW )
tN (K)
 
 (K) + k1q (K)  c

f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t(K;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt  r
where t1 is the rst state of the world where producer 1 is constrained, Q^ (k1 ; t) = k1+(N   1)N (k1 ; t)
is the aggregate production, and N (k1 ; t) is the equilibrium production from the remaining (N   1)
identical producers, that solves:

 
k1 + (N   1)N (k1 ; t)+ N (k1 ; t) q  k1 + (N   1)N (k1 ; t) = c:
N (k1 ; t)  k1 for t 2 t1; tN (K): lower-capacity producer 1 is constrained, while the (N   1)
higher capacity producers are not. Since quantities are strategic substitutes, @
N
@k1 < 0 and:
0 <
@Q^
@k1
= 1 + (N   1) @
N
@k1
< 1:


Q^

+k1q

Q^

 c =  k1   N q Q^ @Q^@k1  0 for t 2 t1; tN (K).   K; tN (K)+k1q  K; tN (K) =
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c, and t (K) + k
1qt (K)  0, hence  (K) + k1q (K)  c  0 for t  tN (K). Therefore:
@1
@k1

k1 ;
K
N
; :::;
K
N

+ r > 0
for k1 < K

N , hence no negative deviation is protable.
Consider now a positive deviation, i.e., kN > K

N while k
n = K

N for all n < N . Since K =
kN + N 1N K
 > K :
@NCM
@kN

K
N
; :::;
K
N
; kN

=
@N
@kN

K
N
; :::;
K
N
; kN

+ kNH
0
(K) +H (K) ;
and
@2NCM
(@kN )2

K
N
; :::;
K
N
; kN

=
@2N
(@kN )2

K
N
; :::;
K
N
; kN

+ kNH
00
(K) + 2H
0
(K) :
Analysis presented in the technical supplement G shows that, for kN > KN ,
@2N
@ (kN )2

KC
N
; :::;
KC
N
; kN

=
Z t(K;pW )
tN
h
2q

K^; t

+ kNqq

K^; t
i
f (t) dt (16)
+kNq

K^; t
 
K; pW

f
 
t
 
K; pW
 @t  K; pW 
@kN
< 0:
Thus,
@NCM
@kN

K
N
; :::;
K
N
; kN

<
@N
@kN

K
N
; :::;
K
N

+
K
N
H
0
(K) + r < 0
since condition (8) implies K

N H
0
(K) + r < 0.
Hence,
 
K
N ; :::;
K
N

is a symmetric equilibrium. Finally, no other symmetric equilibrium exists
since n
 
K
N ; :::;
K
N

+ KNH (K) is concave.
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D Financial reliability options
D.1 Investment decision before options market
The equilibrium is solved by backwards induction. In the second stage, producers solve the equilibrium
of the option market, taking (kn;k n) as given.
We assume that including the option market does not decrease investment, i.e., K  KC  pS. As
suggested by Cramton and Ockenfels, the SO imposes the restriction that all capacity is sold forward:
n  kn . This restriction is made operational by conditioning prots from the option market to
n  kn . Since these prots are positive, n  kn is a dominant strategy, hence holds.
Producersexpected prot is:
nRO (k
n ; n ;k n; n) = n (kn ;k n; ) + nHRO () +

kn   K
n


	
 
K; pS

D.1.1 Equilibrium in the options market
@nRO
@n
(n ; n) = HRO () + nH
0
RO () 
  n
2
K	
 
K; pS

:
We prove that n = K

N  kn for all n is a symmetric equilibrium. Consider rst a negative
deviation, i.e., 1 < K

N while 
n = K

N for all n > 1. Since 
1  k1 ,  = 1 + N 1N K < K,
@1RO
@1

1 ;
K
N
; :::;
K
N

= r  
N 1
N K

2
K	
 
K; pS

:
Since n  kn for all n,   K,
N 1
N K

2
K	
 
K; pS
  N 1N K
1 + N 1N K
	
 
K; pS

< 	
 
K; pS

;
hence
@1RO
@1

1 ;
K
N
; :::;
K
N

> r  	  K; pS  r  	  KC  pS ; pS  0
by condition (9). No negative deviation is protable.
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Consider now a positive deviation, i.e., N > K

N  kN while n = K

N for all n < N .
@NRO
@N

K
N
; :::;
K
N
; N

= HRO () + NH
0
RO () 
  N
2
K	
 
K; pS

:
 = kN + N 1N K
 > K, therefore HRO () + NH
0
RO () < HRO (K
) + K

N H
0
RO (K
) < 0 by
condition (8), hence @
N
RO
@N
 
K
N ; :::;
K
N ; 
N

< 0 for all N > K

N . No positive deviation is protable.
n = K

N for all n is therefore an equilibrium.
We now prove n = K

N  kn for all n is the unique symmetric equilibrium. Consider rst
n = N <
K
N for all n:
@nRO
@n


N
; :::;

N

= r   N   1
N
K

	
 
K; pS

> r  	  K; pS > 0:
No symmetric equilibrium exists with kn  N < K

N for all n.
Finally, consider the case n = N >
K
N for all n:
@nRO
@n


N
; :::;

N

= HRO () +

N
H
0
RO () 
N   1
N
K

K	
 
K; pS

< 0:
There exists no symmetric equilibrium with N >
K
N .
D.1.2 Equilibrium investment
In the rst stage, producers decide on capacity, taking into account the equilibrium of the options
market. Denote V n (kn ;k n) producer n prot function:
V n (kn ;k n) = nRO

kn ;
K
N
;k n;
K
N

= n (kn ;k n; ) +
K
N
r +

kn   K
N

	
 
K; pS

@V n
@kn
=
@n
@kn
+
N   1
N
	
 
K; pS

+

kn   K
N

@	
@K
:
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A necessary condition for a symmetric equilibrium kn = KN is:
@V n
@kn

K
N
; :::;
K
N

=
@n
@kn

K
N
; :::;
K
N

+
N   1
N
	
 
K; pS

@V n
@kn
 
K
N ; :::;
K
N

is decreasing since @
n
@kn
 
K
N ; :::;
K
N

is decreasing and @	@K < 0.
@V n
@kn (0; :::; 0) =
@n
@kn (0; :::; 0)+
N 1
N 	
 
0; pS

> 0 since (i) @
n
@kn (0; :::; 0) > 0 and (ii) 	
 
0; pS

> 0 by construction. limK!+1 @V
n
@kn (K) =
 r < 0. Hence, there exists a unique KCRO > 0 such that @
n
RO
@kn

KCRO
N ; :::;
KCRO
N

= 0. This is equation
(11).
We now prove that kn = K
C
RO
N for all n is an equilibrium. Consider rst a negative deviation:
k1 <
KCRO
N while k
n =
KCRO
N for all n > 1. Total installed capacity is K = k
1 + N 1N K
C
RO < K
C
RO.
Substituting expression (15) for @
n
@kn

k1 ;
KCRO
N ; :::;
KCRO
N

,
@V 1
@k1

k1 ;
KCRO
N
; :::;
KCRO
N

=
Z tN (K)
t1
 


Q^ (k1 ; t)

+ k1q

Q^ (k1 ; t)
 @Q^
@k1
  c
!
f (t) dt
+
Z t(K;pS)
tN (K)
 
 (K) + k1q (K)  c

f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t(K;pS)
 
pS   c+ N   1
N
 
 (K; t)  pS+ k1   K
N

q (K; t)

f (t) dt  r:
Substituting in equation (11), observing that tN (K) < tN
 
KCRO

and t
 
K; pS

< t
 
KCRO; p
S

since
K < KCRO, and rearranging yields
@V 1
@k1

k1 ;
KCRO
N
; :::;
KCRO
N

=
Z tN (K)
t1
 


Q^

+ k1q

Q^
 @Q^
@k1
  c
!
f (t) dt
+
Z tN(KCRO)
tN (K)
 
 (K) + k1q (K)  c

f (t) dt
+
Z t(K;pS)
tN(KCRO)

 (K) + k1q (K) 


 
KCRO

+
KCRO
N
q
 
KCRO

f (t) dt
+
Z t(KCRO;pS)
t(K;pS)
0B@ pS     KCRO; t  KCRON q  KCRO
+N 1N

 (K; t)  pS + q (K; t)

k1   KCRON

1CA f (t) dt
+
N   1
N
Z +1
t(KCRO;pS)

 (K; t)    KCRO; t+ q (K; t)k1   KCRON

f (t) dt:
Each term is positive:
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1. 

Q^

+ k1q

Q^

@Q^
@k1   c =
 
k1   N q Q^ @Q^@k1  0 for t 2 t1; tN (K)
2. 
 
K; tN (K)

+ k1q
 
K; tN (K)

= c, and t (K) + k
1qt (K)  0, hence  (K) + k1q (K)  c  0
for t 2 tN (K) ; tN  KCRO
3. q (Q) + qqq (Q) < 0, hence  (K) + k
1q (K)   (K) + K
C
RO
N q (K)  
 
KCRO

+
KCRO
N q
 
KCRO

for t 2 tN  KCRO ; t  K; pS
4. 
 
KCRO; t
  pS for t  t  KCRO; pS and  (K; t)  pS for t  t  K; pS, hence

pS     KCRO; t  KCRON q  KCRO+ N   1N   (K; t)  pS

 0
for t 2
h
tp
S
(K) ; tp
S  
KCRO
i
5. K  KCRO, yields  (K; t)  
 
KCRO; t

for all t
Thus, @
1
RO
@k1

k1 ;
KCRO
N ; :::;
KCRO
N

> 0: a negative deviation is not protable.
Consider now a positive deviation, kN > K
C
RO
N while k
n =
KCRO
N for all n < N . K = k
N+N 1N K
C
RO >
KCRO.
@2V N
(@kN )2

KCRO
N
; :::;
KCRO
N
; kN

=
@2N
(@kN )2
++2
N   1
N
@	
@K
+

kN   K
N

@2	
(@K)2
=
@2N
(@kN )2
+
N   1
N
Z +1
t(K;pS)

2q (K; t) +

kN   K
C
RO
N

qq (K; t)

f (t) dt
 

kN   K
N

q
 
K; t
 
K; pS

f
 
t
 
K; pS
 @t  K; pS
@K
:
Substituting in @
2N
(@kN )2
from equation (16),
@2V N
(@kN )2

KCRO
N
; :::;
KCRO
N
; kN

=
Z t(K;pS)
tN
h
2q

K^; t

+ kNqq

K^; t
i
f (t) dt
+
N   1
N
Z +1
t(K;pS)

2q (K; t) +

kN   K
C
RO
N

qq (K; t)

f (t) dt
+
K
N
q
 
K; t
 
K; pS

f
 
t
 
K; pS
 @t  K; pS
@K
< 0:
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A positive deviation is not protable.
Therefore

KCRO
N ; :::;
KCRO
N

constitute an equilibrium. Furthermore,
@2V n
@ (kn)2

K
N
; :::;
K
N

=
Z tpS
tN

2q (K; t) +
K
N
qq (K; t)

f (t) dt+ 2
N   1
N
Z +1
tp
S
q (K; t) f (t) dt
+
K
N
q
 
K; t
 
K; pS

f
 
t
 
K; pS
 @t  K; pS
@K
< 0
hence

KCRO
N ; :::;
KCRO
N

is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
Finally, we prove in the main text that KC
 
pS
  KCRO < K.
D.2 Options market before investment decision
D.2.1 Equilibrium investment
In the second stage, producers decide on capacity, taking n as given. Producers n prot is:
nRO (k
n ; n ;k n; n) = n (kn ;k n; ) + nHRO () +

kn   K
n


	
 
K; pS

Then:
@nRO
@kn
=
@n
@kn
+

1  
n


	
 
K; pS

+

kn   K
N

@	
@K
Suppose n = N for all n. k
n = KN for all n yields the following necessary condition:
@n
@kn

K
N
; :::;
K
N

+
N   1
N
	
 
K; pS

= 0
which is equation (11). kn = K
C
RO
N for all n is an equilibrium candidate.
Using the same argument as in the previous section, kn = K
C
RO
N for all n is the unique symmetric
equilibrium of the investment game, assuming that n = N for all n.
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D.2.2 Equilibrium in the options market
In the rst-stage, producers solve the equilibrium of the option market, replacing n by n (kn;k n).
Suppose a symmetric equilibrium n = N exists. Then, k
n =
KCRO
N for all n and producer n expected
prot is
V n (n ; n) = n

KCRO
N
; :::;
KCRO
N

+ nHRO () +

1
N
  
n


	
 
KCRO; p
S

Hence:
@V n
@n
= HRO () + nH
0
RO () 
  n
2
	
 
KCRO; p
S

since KCRO is independent of 
n by equation (). The previous analysis then applies:  = K is the
only symmetric equilibrium.
Proving existence of a symmetric equilibrium in the general case is beyond the scope of this work.
I provide below a heuristic argument, in the case N = 2. Consider rst 2 < 1 = K

2 . Suppose there
exists a unique interior equilibrium of the investment game,
 
k1 (1; 2) ; k
2 (1; 2)

, dened by:
8><>:
@1RO
@k1
= @
1
@k1
+ 
2
(1+2)
	 +
k12 k21

@	
@K = 0
@2RO
@k2
= @
2
@k2
+ 
1
(2+1)
	 +
k21 k12

@	
@K = 0
:
Then,
@V 1
@1
=
@1RO
@k1
@k1
@1
+
@1RO
@k2
@k2
@1
+
@1RO
@1
:
@1RO
@k1
 
k1; k2

= 0 since
 
k1; k2

is the equilibrium, and
@1RO
@k2
=
 
@1
@k2
  
1 
1 + 2
	   K; pS+ k12   k21 
1 + 2
 @	
@K
!
@1
@k2
< 0 since capacities are strategic complements, 	
 
K; pS

> 0, thus, if
k12 k21
(1+2)
@	
@K is small
enough, @
1
RO
@k2
< 0: capacities remain strategic complements including the options market. I provide
in the technical supplement H su¢ cient conditions for @
k2
@1
< 0. A heuristic argument is that increasing
1 increases rm 1 exposure to spot prices, hence increases k1, hence reduces k2 since capacities are
strategic complements. Thus, we expect @
1
RO
@k2
@k2
@1
> 0. Since @
1
RO
@1
> 0, @V
1
@1 > 0, a negative deviation
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is not protable.
Consider now a positive deviation, 2 > 1 = K

2 . Then,
@V 2
@2
=
@2RO
@k1
@k1
@2
+HRO
 
1 + 2

+ 2H
0
RO
 
1 + 2
  1 
1 + 2
2K	  K; pS
@2RO
@k1
@k1
@2
> 0, which goes in the "wrong" direction. However, since

  1
(1+2)
2K	
 
K; pS

> 0 and
HRO + 
2H
0
RO > 0, we should still have
@V 2
@2 < 0.
D.3 Simultaneous option market and investment decision
If the decisions are simultaneous, the previous rst-order conditions determine a symmetric equilibrium
candidate. The previous arguments apply, and it constitutes the unique symmetric equilibrium.
E Average V oLL pricing
Suppose a fraction of constant price customers must be curtailed for capacity K. t^ (K) < +1, and
the average V oLL when constant price customers are curtailed is:
v (K) =
R +1
t^(K)  (K; t) f (t) dtR +1
t^(K) f (t) dt
:
The rule proposed by Stoft (2002) leads to the following inverse demand function for producers:  (K; t)
for t  bt and a horizontal inverse demand at v for t > bt. This creates a discontinuity in producers
prot at t = t^ (K) since

 
K; t^ (K)

< v (K) = lim
t!t^(K)+
v (K) :
Thus,

 (K) = 	 (K; c) +
 

 
K; t^
  v (K) f  t^ @t^
@K
 
Z +1
t^(K)
( (K; t)  v (K)) f (t) dt
= 	(K; c) +
 

 
K; t^
  v (K) f  t^ @t^
@K
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since
R +1
t^(K) ( (K; t)  v (K)) f (t) dt = 0 by denition of v (K). Therefore:

 (K) = r      K; t^  v (K) f  t^ @t^
@K
< r
since @t^@K > 0.
F Energy cum operating reserves market
Dene the total surplus
S (p; ; t) = S (p (t) ; t) + (1  )S (p; ; t)
and total demand
D (p; ; t) = S (p (t) ; t) + (1  )D (p; ; t) :
The social planners program is:
max
fp(t);(t)g;K
E
n
S (p (t) ;  (t) ; t)  cD (p (t) ;  (t) ; t)
o
  rK
st : (1 + h (t)) D (p (t) ;  (t) ; t)  K ( (t))
The associated Lagrangian is:
L = E
n
S (p (t) ;  (t) ; t)  cD (p (t) ;  (t) ; t) +  (t)
h
K   (1 + h (t)) D (p (t) ;  (t) ; t)
io
  rK
and: 8>>>><>>>>:
@L
@p(t) = fp (t)  [c+ (1 + h (t)) (t)]g @
D
@p(t)
@L
@(t) =
n
vt
h
D (p (t) ;  (t)) ;  (t)
i
  [c+ (1 + h (t)) (t)]
o
@D
@(t)
@L
@K = E [ (t)]  r
First, o¤-peak  (t) = 0 and  (t) = 1. Then p (t) = c = w (t). This holds as long as 

Q
1+h(t) ; t

= c
for Q  K , t  tOR (K; c).
Second, on-peak, if constant price customers are not curtailed, (1 + h (t)) D (p (t) ; 1; t) = K hence
 (t) > 0 and  (t) = 1. Then p (t) = c+ (t) (1 + h (t)) = 

K
1+h(t) ; t

and  (t) = w (t) c = p(t) c1+h(t) >
0.
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Finally, constant price customers may have to be curtailed, (1 + h (t)) D (p (t) ;  (t) ; t) = K for
 (t) < 1 such that (1 + h (t)) D (v;  (t) ; t) = K. Then (1 + h (t)) (t) = 

K
1+h(t) ; t

  c as before.
The optimal capacity KOR is then dened by E [ (t)] = r which yields equation (13).
As discussed in Section 7, the producersproblem is isomorphic to the previous Sections, except
that s
n(t)
1+h(t) replaces production q
n (t). The proof of equation (14) then follows the steps of Lemmata
3 to 6 presented in the technical report G.
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Technical Report
Not part of the paper
Available upon request
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G Derivation of the Cournot capacity
For the readers convenience, the derivation of the Cournot equilibrium capacity is presented here.
The proof follows Zöttl (2011). The main di¤erence is the introduction of rationing.
G.1 Capacity constrained Cournot equilibrium without a price cap
Producers are ordered by increasing capacity: k1  k2 :::  kN .
The unconstrained Cournot aggregate outputQC (t) in state t is dened by  (Q; t) c+QN q (Q; t) =
0. Under Assumption 4, the implicit function theorem yields:
dQC
dt
=  

t +
Q
N
qt

q +
q +Qqq
N
 1
> 0
Lemma 3 Dene t0 = 0. For a given vector k 2RN of generation capacities, there exists N critical
states of the world 0  t1  t2  :::  tN such that q^n (k;t), the equilibrium output for producer n, is
characterized by
q^n (k;t) =
8><>: 
j+1 (k1 ; :::; kj ; t) if t 2 [tj ; tj+1 ] for j < n
kn if t  tn
where j+1 (k1 ; :::; kj ; t) dened on [tj ; tj+1 ] is the solution of a "modied Cournot condition":

 
jX
i=1
ki + (N   j)j+1 ; t
!
  c+ j+1q
 
jX
i=1
ki + (N   j)j+1 ; t
!
= 0
8n  N , q^n (k;t) is continuous in all its arguments and increasing in t.
Producers expected prot is:
n (kn ;k n) =
n 1X
j=0
Z tj+1
tj
j+1



Q^

  c

f (t) dt+ kn
NX
j=n
"Z tj+1
tj



Q^

  c

f (t) dt  r
#
where Q^ (k;t) =
PN
n=1 q^
n (k;t) is the aggregate output.
Proof. Construction of the equilibrium proceeds by induction on n  N . As seen previously, QC (t)
is increasing in t. Denote t1 the rst state such that QC (t1) = k1. Suppose t1 ! +1, then 8t  0,
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QC (t) < k1  k2  :::  kN . Then:
1 (k1 ;k 1) = E

QC (t)
 

 
QC (t) ; t
  c  rk1
and @
1
@k1 =  r < 0, hence 1
 
k1

< 0 since 1 (0) = 0. This contradicts producer 1 individual
rationality, hence t1 exists by contradiction. Denote Q^1 (t) = QC (t) and 1 (t) = Q
C(t)
N .
Suppose now we have characterized the equilibrium up until tn, dened by n (k1 ; :::; kn 1 ; tn) = kn.
We now search for an equilibrium for t  tn. Suppose all generators i = 1; ::; n produce up to their
capacity ki. The prot of any generator j > n is:
j (qj ;q j ; t) = qj
0BB@
0BB@ nX
i=1
ki + qj +
NX
i=n+1
i6=j
qi ; t
1CCA  c
1CCA
As long as producer (n+ 1) is not constrained, we have:
@j
@qj
= 
0BB@ nX
i=1
ki + qj +
NX
i=n+1
i6=j
qi ; t
1CCA  c+ qjq
0BB@ nX
i=1
ki + qj +
NX
i=n+1
i6=j
qi ; t
1CCA
Since the rst-order conditions are symmetric, a symmetric interior equilibrium n+1 (k1 ; :::; kn ; t) is
characterized by:

 
nX
i=1
ki + (N   n)n+1 ; t
!
  c+ n+1q
 
nX
i=1
ki + (N   n)n+1 ; t
!
= 0
Since j (:; t) is strictly concave, n+1 is a maximum, hence it constitutes a best response to the others
strategies. n+1 is increasing in t, since by the implicit function theorem:
@n+1
@t
=   t + 
n+1qt
(N   n+ 1)

q +
N n
N n+1
n+1qq
 > 0
Furthermore, n+1 (tn) = n (tn) = kn. To see that, we observe that n+1 (tn) veries:
@j
@qj
(tn) = 
 
nX
i=1
ki + (N   n)n+1 ; tn
!
  c+ n+1q
 
nX
i=1
ki + (N   n)n+1 ; tn
!
= 0
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while n (t) solves:

 
n 1X
i=1
ki + (N   n+ 1)n ; t
!
  c+ nq
 
n 1X
i=1
ki + (N   n+ 1)n ; t
!
= 0
hence, since q^n (tn) = kn by construction:

 
nX
i=1
ki + (N   n) kn ; tn
!
  c+ knq
 
nX
i=1
ki + (N   n) kn ; tn
!
= 0
Since j (:; tn) is strictly concave, there exists a unique value such that @
j
@qj (t
n) = 0 hence n+1 (tn) =
kn = n (tn).
Producer (n+ 1) produces n+1 (k1 ; :::; kn ; t) up to tn+1 dened by n+1 (k1 ; :::; kn ; t) = kn+1. As
before, we can show by contradiction that tn+1 exists. Furthermore, since kn+1  kn, then tn+1  tn.
We now show that ql = kl for l  n is a best response to qj = n+1 for j > n. Suppose
qi = ki 8i  n; i 6= l and qj = n+1 for j > n. Then:
@l
@ql
= 
0B@ nX
i=1
i6=j
ki + ql + (N   n)n+1 ; t
1CA  c+ qlq
0B@ nX
i=1
i6=j
ki + ql + (N   n)n+1 ; t
1CA
hence
@l
@ql

ql=kl
= 
 
nX
i=1
ki + (N   n)n+1 ; t
!
  c+ klq
 
nX
i=1
ki + (N   n)n+1 ; t
!
=   (n+1   kl) q
 
nX
i=1
ki + (N   n)n+1 ; t
!
> 0
since n+1 (t) > n+1 (tn) = kn  kj for t > tn.
We have therefore completed step (n+ 1). By induction, the structure of the equilibria holds up
until n = N , as long as we adopt the convention: tN+1 ! +1, N+1 (t) = 0 and Q^ (tN ) = K = Q^ (t)
8t  tN .
From the previous discussion, q^n (k;t) and Q^ (k;t) are continuous and increasing in t.
The expression of prots follow directly from the characterization of equilibria above.
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G.2 Capacity constrained Cournot equilibrium with price cap
Lemma 4 Suppose the capacity constraint binds before the price cap constraint, i.e., tN  t  K; pW 
at the equilibrium. Producer ns equilibrium prot for the constrained Cournot game in state t is:
n (kn;k n) =
n 1X
j=0
Z tj+1
tj
j+1



Q^

  c

f (t) dt (17)
+kn
8<:
NX
j=n
"Z tj+1
tj



Q^

  c

f (t) dt
#
+
Z +1
t(K;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt  r
9=;
where tj for j = 1; :::; N is the rst state of the world such that all producers up to j are capacity
constrained, t0 = 0 and the convention tN+1 = t
 
K; pW

, j+1 is producer ns output in state t 2
tj ; tj+1

for j < n, and Q^ is the equilibrium aggregate output.
Proof. In the o¤-peak states of the world where at least one generator is unconstrained, i.e., with our
previous notation t < tN (K)  t  K; pW , imposition of the price cap has no impact on the equilibrium
in these states, and Lemma 3 applies.
Consider now the peak states of the world t  tN (K), and Q^ (t) = K =
NX
m=1
km. As long as
 (K; t)  pW , imposition of the price cap has no impact on the equilibrium in these states, and
Lemma 3 applies.
States of the world may exist where  (K; t) > pW . Then, for t  t  K; pW , p (t) = pW . Facing a
constant price, generators individually maximize production to maximize prot, hence qn (t) = kn for
all n is an equilibrium. This then yields equation (17). However, the SO must ration demand.
G.3 Equilibrium investment
Lemma 5 For any (kn;k n):
@n
@kn
(kn;k n) =
NX
j=n
"Z tj+1
tj
 


Q^

  c+ knq

Q^
 @Q^
@kn
!
f (t) dt
#
+
Z +1
t(K;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt  r:
(18)
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For any kN  KN
@2N
(@kN )2

K
N
; :::;
K
N
; kN

=
Z t(K;pW )
tN
h
2q

K^; t

+ kNqq

K^; t
i
f (t) dt (19)
+kNq

K^; t

K^; pW

f

t

K^; pW
 @tK^; pW
@kN
< 0
where K^ = kn + N 1N K. Furthermore, 
n
 
K
N ; ::;
K
N

is globally concave.
Proof. The rst-order derivative of prot function is:
@n
@kn
=
NX
j=n
"Z tj+1
tj
 


Q^

  c+ knq

Q^
 @Q^
@kn
!
f (t) dt
#
+
Z +1
t(K;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt  r +1
where
1 = kn
NX
j=n



Q^ (tj+1) ; tj+1

  c

f (tj+1 )
@tj+1
@kn
 



Q^ (tj ) ; tj

  c

f (tj )
@tj
@kn

+q^n (tn)



Q^ (tn) ; tn

  c

f (tn)
@tn
@kn
  kn  pW   c f  t  K; pW  @t  K; pW 
@kn
= 0
since q^n (tn) = kn and 

Q^
 
t
 
K; pW

; t
 
K; pW

= pW . This proves equation (18).
Suppose kN  KCN while kn = K
C
N for all n < N . Equation (18) yields:
@N
@kN

KC
N
; :::;
KC
N
; kN

=
Z t(K;pW )(K)
tN (K)
 
 (K; t) + kNq (K; t)  c

f (t) dt+
Z +1
t(K;pW )(K)
 
pW   c f (t) dt r:
Thus:
@2N
@ (kN )2

KC
N
; :::;
KC
N
; kN

=
Z t(K;pW )
tN
h
2q

K^; t

+ kNqq

K^; t
i
f (t) dt
+kNq

K^; t
 
K; pW

f
 
t
 
K; pW
 @t  K; pW 
@kN
< 0:
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This proves equation (19). Then, selecting kN = KN proves the global concavity of 
n
 
K
N ; ::;
K
N

.
Lemma 6 KC solution of
Z t(K;pW )(KC)
tN (KC)


 
KC ; t

+
KC
N
q
 
KC ; t
  c f (t) dt+ Z +1
t(KC ;pW )(KC)
 
pW   c f (t) dt = r
is the only symmetric equilibrium investment.
Proof. If kn = KN , for all n, all producers are constrained simultaneously: t
n = tN for all n. The rst
order derivative (18) then becomes:
@n
@kn

K
N
; :::;
K
N

=
Z t(K;pW )(K)
tN (K)

 (K; t) +
K
N
q (K; t)  c

f (t) dt+
Z +1
t(K;pW )(K)
 
pW   c f (t) dt r:
@n
@kn (0; :::; 0) =
R t(K;pW )
0 ( (0; t)  c) f (t) dt +
R +1
t(K;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt   r > pW   (c+ r) > 0
since  (0; t) > pW > (c+ r) by equation (5). limK!+1 @
n
@kn
 
K
N ; :::;
K
N

=  r < 0. Hence KC > 0
such that @
n
@kn

KC
N ; :::;
KC
N

= 0 exists.
We now prove that

KC
N ; :::;
KC
N

is an equilibrium. Consider rst a negative deviation: k1  KCN
while kn = K
C
N for all n > 1. Total installed capacity is K = k
1 + N 1N K
C  KC .
@1
@k1

k1 ;
KC
N
; :::;
KC
N

=
Z tN (K)
t1
 


Q^

+ k1q

Q^
 @Q^
@k1
  c
!
f (t) dt
+
Z t(K;pW )(K)
tN (K)
 
 (K) + k1q (K)  c

f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t(K;pW )(K)
 
pW   c f (t) dt  r
=
Z tN (K)
t1
 


Q^

+ k1q

Q^
 @Q^
@k1
  c
!
f (t) dt
+
Z t(K;pW )
tN (K)
 
 (K) + k1q (K)  c

f (t) dt
 
Z t(KC ;pW )
tN (KC)


 
KC

+
KC
N
q
 
KC
  c f (t) dt
+
Z +1
t(K;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt  Z +1
t(KC ;pW )
 
pW   c f (t) dt
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tN (K)  tN  KC and t  K; pW  (K)  tpW  KC since K < KC . Then:
@1
@k1

k1 ;
KC
N
; :::;
KC
N

=
Z tN (K)
t1
 


Q^

+ k1q

Q^
 @Q^
@k1
  c
!
f (t) dt
+
Z tN(KC)
tN (K)
 
 (K) + k1q (K)  c

f (t) dt
+
Z t(K;pW )
tN (K)

 (K) + k1q (K) 


 
KC

+
KC
N
q
 
KC

f (t) dt
+
Z t(KC ;pW )
t(K;pW )

pW     KC  KC
N
q
 
KC

f (t) dt:


Q^

+k1q

Q^

 c =  k1   N q Q^ @Q^@k1  0 for t 2 t1; tN (K).   K; tN (K)+k1q  K; tN (K) =
c, and t (K) + k
1qt (K)  0, hence  (K) + k1q (K)   c  0 for t 2

tN (K) ; tN
 
KC

. q (Q) +
qqq (Q) < 0, hence  (K)+k
1q (K)   (K)+K
C
N q (K)  
 
KC

+K
C
N q
 
KC
 
k1   KCN

q

Q^

@Q^
@k1 
0 for t 2 tN (K) ; t  K; pW  (K). Finally,   KC  pW for t  tpW (KC), hence pW     KC  
KC
N q
 
KC
  0 for t 2 ht  K; pW  (K) ; tpW (KC)i. Thus, @1@k1 k1 ; KCN ; :::; KCN   0: a negative devi-
ation is not protable.
From equation (19), @
N
@kN

KC
N ; :::;
KC
N ; k
N

is decreasing for kN  KCN , hence @
N
@kN

KC
N ; :::;
KC
N ; k
N


0: a positive deviation is not protable.
Therefore,

KC
N ; :::;
KC
N

is a symmetric equilibrium. Furthermore, KC is the only symmetric
equilibrium since n
 
K
N ; :::;
K
N

is globally concave.
H Asymmetric equilibrium: sign of @k
2
@1
Suppose there exists a unique interior equilibrium of the investment game,
 
k1 (1; 2) ; k
2 (1; 2)

,
dened by: 8><>:
@1RO
@k1
= @
1
@k1
+ 
2
(1+2)
	 +
k12 k21

@	
@K = 0
@2RO
@k2
= @
2
@k2
+ 
1
(2+1)
	 +
k21 k12

@	
@K = 0
:
Dene
 
 
k1; k2; 1 ; 2

=
@1
@k1
 
k1; k2

+
2 
1 + 2
	  k1 + k2+ k12   k21

@	
@K
 
k1 + k2

:
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The rst order conditions dening the equilibrium can recast as:
 
 
k1; k2; 1 ; 2

=  
 
k2; k1; 2; 1

= 0:
Full di¤erentiation of the system with respect to 1 yields:
8><>:

 1
@k1
@1
+  2
@k2
@1
+  3
  
k1; k2; 1 ; 2

= 0
 1
@k2
@1
+  2
@k1
@1
+  4
  
k2; k1; 2 ; 1

= 0
;
where  k corresponds to the derivative with respect to the k
th argument. Thus, assuming  =
 1
 
k1; k2; 1 ; 2

 1
 
k2; k1; 2 ; 1
   2  k1; k2; 1 ; 2 2  k2; k1; 2 ; 1 6= 0,
@k2
@1
=
 3
 
k1; k2; 1 ; 2

 2
 
k2; k1; 2 ; 1
   4  k2; k1; 2 ; 1 1  k1; k2; 1 ; 2

:
 3
 
k1; k2; 1 ; 2

=   
2
(1 + 2 )2

	+K
@	
@K

=   4
 
k2; k1; 2 ; 1

;
thus
@k2
@1
=   
2
(1 + 2 )2

	+K
@	
@K

 1
 
k1; k2; 1 ; 2

+  2
 
k2; k1; 2 ; 1


:
We examine the sign of each term in turn. Suppose demand follows the specication presented in
Section 3. Then,

	+K
@	
@K
 
K; pS

=
1
 (1 + )
 
a0   bK  
 
pS + (1  ) pR
a1
!  
a0  
 
pS + (1  ) pR  (2 + ) bK
which is negative for most values of K and pS . We assume this property holds for other specications.
Then,
 1
 
k1; k2; 1 ; 2

=
@21
(@k1)2
+
22 
1 + 2
 @	
@K
+
k12   k21 
1 + 2
 @2	
(@K)2
and
 2
 
k1; k2; 1 ; 2

=
@21
@k1@k2
+
2   1 
1 + 2
 @	
@K
+
k12   k21 
1 + 2
 @2	
(@K)2
:
Assuming @
21
(@k1)2
and
k12 k21
(1+2)
@2	
(@K)2
are small,  1
 
k1; k2; 1 ; 2

< 0, which guarantees that k1 is
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indeed the best response to k2.
 1
 
k1; k2; 1 ; 2

+  2
 
k2; k1; 2 ; 1

=
@21
(@k1)2
+
@21
@k1@k2
+
@	
@K
:
@	
@K < 0, and
@21
@k1@k2
< 0 since capacities are strategic complements. @
21
(@k1)2
< 0 for k1 > k2. Suppose
@21
(@k1)2
is small enough, then
 1
 
k1; k2; 1 ; 2

+  2
 
k2; k1; 2 ; 1

< 0:
Finally,
 1
 
k1; k2; 1 ; 2
   2  k1; k2; 1 ; 2 = @21
(@k1)2
  @
21
@k1@k2
+
@	
@K
:
Assuming that @	@K dominates,  1
 
k1; k2; 1 ; 2
   2  k1; k2; 1 ; 2 < 0.
Consider rst the case 1 < 2. Then, assuming
k12 k21
(1+2)
@2	
(@K)2
is small,  2
 
k1; k2; 1 ; 2

< 0.
Then:
 1
 
k1; k2; 1 ; 2

<  2
 
k1; k2; 1 ; 2
)  1  k1; k2; 1 ; 2 1  k2; k1; 2 ; 1 >  2  k1; k2; 1 ; 2 1  k2; k1; 2 ; 1 ;
 1
 
k2; k1; 2 ; 1

<  2
 
k2; k1; 2 ; 1
)  2  k1; k2; 1 ; 2 1  k2; k1; 2 ; 1 >  2  k2; k1; 2 ; 1 2  k1; k2; 1 ; 2 ;
thus
 1
 
k1; k2; 1 ; 2

 1
 
k2; k1; 2 ; 1

>  2
 
k2; k1; 2 ; 1

 2
 
k1; k2; 1 ; 2
,  > 0:
Thus, @
k2
@1
=   2
(1+2 )
2

	+K
@	
@K

| {z }
 
 z }| {
 1
 
k1; k2; 1 ; 2

+  2
 
k2; k1; 2 ; 1


+
< 0: If 1 > 2,  2
 
k2; k1; 2 ; 1

<
0. The same argument also yields @
k2
@1
< 0.
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